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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 In the current climate of partisan gridlock in Washington, D.C., Americans have turned to 
state legislatures to address the important political issues of our time. From immigration to the 
regulation of genetically modified organisms in our food supply, state legislatures have been 
creating stopgap policies for issues that would best be handled by Congress, in an effort to force 
the federal government to act. Since state legislatures are being forced to address these additional 
issues, it is now more important than ever for these institutions to operate as effectively as 
possible. In these institutions, most tangible work takes place in standing committees, which are 
committees that meet on a regular and annual basis, with the ability to refer bills to the entire 
legislature.1 Standing committees are frequently referred to as the workhorses of legislatures. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of the joint committee system, like the 
one used in the Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts state legislatures, as a model for other 
state legislatures to follow. Joint committees are standing committees with members from both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives that are co-chaired by both a senator and a 
representative, who will typically alternate in presiding over committee meetings and public 
hearings (Satter 2009, 23). 
This thesis will address the following research question, which has not yet been studied 
in much depth in political science literature:  
Does the joint committee system primarily used in the Connecticut, Maine, and 
Massachusetts state legislatures lead to a more effective legislative process than the 
traditional bicameral committee system primarily used in the New Hampshire, Vermont, 
and Rhode Island state legislatures? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Throughout this work, when I refer to committees or joint committees, assume that I am writing about standing 
committees. If I intend to write about other types of committees, I will specifically refer to them as such. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, effectiveness is defined as the ability of committees to maximize 
legislative time by resolving differences between chambers in order to ensure that both chambers 
pass the bills they report out. The following analysis will show that joint committees are more 
effective because they give legislators a chance to focus their time more effectively on legislation 
that is more likely to pass both houses. In joint committees, legislators from both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate have the opportunity to interact with each other in an official 
capacity to better determine which pieces of legislation have the best chance of passing both 
houses. As a result, legislatures that use joint committees tend to have fewer steps in their 
legislative process, which makes the process easier for citizens to follow. A simpler legislative 
process presents fewer opportunities for legislation to die a confusing death later in the process, 
such as the second phase of the traditional bicameral committee process, and ensures that 
legislation is more likely to die before reaching either chamber, which prevents the waste of 
precious legislative time on issues that have no chance of becoming law. These ideas will be 
explored further in later chapters. 
 
Literature Review 
All state legislatures in the United States are organized based upon the principle of 
bicameralism meaning they consist of two chambers, which are typically called the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, except for Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature. A 
criticism of the joint committee system is the idea that it undermines the theory of the bicameral 
system because "it substitutes a single consideration of a measure for consideration by each 
house separately" (Dodds and Lapp 1918, 50). This criticism was used to justify the abolishment 
of all joint committees in the state of Vermont in 1917. However, it can be argued that this 
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criticism is unwarranted as long as the opportunity remains for one chamber to refer a bill to a 
committee of its own members if there is disagreement between the chambers in the joint 
committee (Dodds and Lapp 1918, 50-1). This criticism also seems unwarranted because each 
chamber still has a chance to debate each measure when it reaches the floor for consideration. 
 In fact, the use of the bicameral system in state legislatures may not be entirely justified. 
In Congress, the bicameral system is justified because the seats in each chamber are apportioned 
to represent substantially different constituencies. The House of Representatives is apportioned 
based upon population and the Senate is apportioned based upon the states as political entities 
within the federal system (Hagan 1962). Congress was set up this way to prevent the short-term 
pressures of the electorate from influencing the entire legislative process by limiting the 
influence of these pressures to the House of Representatives. Since only one third of the Senate 
is up for reelection in any given election year and its members represent larger, more diverse 
constituencies, senators are more likely to pay attention to long-term trends, rather than short-
term pressures. According to Charles B. Hagan, "unless the second chamber represents a 
substantially different constituency than the first chamber it does not seem necessary to have it" 
(1962). In the 49 states with bicameral legislatures, both chambers are apportioned based upon 
population, with the only difference being that the upper house has fewer seats than the lower 
house. State legislatures can only be apportioned based upon population since the 1964 Supreme 
Court decision Reynolds v. Sims addressed the issue of malapportionment by ruling that both 
chambers must be apportioned based upon the principle of "one person, one vote." 
 In the past half-century, several political scientists have conducted research to find 
whether the use of the bicameral system in state legislatures is needed to protect the integrity of 
the legislative system. According to Alan L. Clem, "legislative structures and procedures already 
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provide several stages at which bills are subjected to close scrutiny. It does not require a second 
legislative chamber to achieve this" (1978, 6). Clem suggests, "the real argument over 
bicameralism concerns which policy interests would be helped or hurt by a simpler, more visible 
legislative process" (1978, 6). He believes that bicameralism makes it easier for groups to delay 
or kill legislation that is considered dangerous to their interests, which consistently favors 
political elites and goes against the interests of the unorganized mass public (Clem 1978, 6). 
When a legislative process has more steps, there are more opportunities for legislation to fail. It 
seems that Clem is trying to say that interest groups and political elites know how to take 
advantage of these opportunities better than the average citizen. 
 In addition, Michael Cutrone and Nolan McCarty find the case for bicameralism to be 
"less than overwhelming" (2006, 32). They claim, "much of the empirical evidence of the policy 
effects [of] bicameralism is either weak or attributable to either malapportionment or 
supermajoritarianism, outcomes that could theoretically be produced in unicameral legislatures" 
(Cutrone and McCarty 2006, 32). It seems that both Clem and Cutrone and McCarty suggest that 
a unicameral legislature can be just as effective, if not more, than a bicameral legislature. The 
joint committee system seems to offer a balance between the unicameral and bicameral systems. 
Joint committees preserve the elements of bicameralism that allow each chamber to check the 
power of the other and minimize the amount of unnecessary repetition that tends to take place in 
bicameral legislatures. Joint committees seem to combine the best elements of both systems. 
 Although no significant in-depth comparative research has been done regarding joint 
committees in state legislatures, legislative committees have long been a popular topic of study. 
The first such study was conducted by Woodrow Wilson, who claims, "Congressional 
government is Committee government" and characterizes committees as "little legislatures" 
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(1885, 24, 113). Wilson's characterization of committees makes sense because they make the 
greatest contribution to each piece of legislation that is considered on the floor. Legislative 
committees are the workhorses of legislatures. During Wilson's time, little research was done 
regarding legislative committees because the committees met secretly and did not keep detailed 
records, which explains why Wilson's work is one of the most frequently quoted (Huitt 1954, 
340).  
 Despite the secrecy of Congressional committees during this period, Dr. Lauros G. 
McConachie conducted a more in-depth study of legislative committees, which chronicles the 
complete history of American legislative committees starting from the colonial era and has been 
cited much less frequently than Wilson's book (1898, as cited in Howard 1898, 551-2). 
McConachie finds that admitting private citizens to committee hearings is a healthy sign and 
seems to suggest that committees will continue to become a stronger, more important part of the 
legislative process because of their perception as “little legislatures” (1898, as cited in Howard 
1898, 551-2). It seems that Wilson's book is cited more frequently because his writing style is 
clear and elegant, while McConachie’s writing style is more old-fashioned and difficult to read, 
even though his work is better researched and balanced (Eulau and McCluggage 1984, 200). 
 One of the earliest scholarly works to address joint committees in state legislatures was 
written by political scientist Paul S. Reinsch, who finds that joint committees are used 
extensively in New England, but are set aside for mainly formal occasions in the rest of the 
United States. According to Reinsch, joint committees attract greater public interest because they 
make the legislative process simpler and easier to follow, which makes them less susceptible to 
manipulation, and they save time by avoiding duplication, which allows for closer scrutiny and 
more intensive investigation of legislative issues (1907, 171-4). 
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 As the study of state legislative committees has become more popular, some political 
scientists have come up with criteria by which the performance of committees can be evaluated. 
Political scientist Alan Rosenthal identifies five criteria that can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of state legislative committees, which are based upon their willingness and ability: 
"(1) to get bills referred to them, without being bypassed; (2) to deny favorable reports to bills; 
(3) to amend bills; (4) to get their bills adopted to the floor without change; and (5) to engage in 
productive interim studies" (Jewell 1975, 303). Clem conducted a case study to investigate the 
success of committees in the South Dakota legislature in performing the lawmaking function, 
which he defines as: "a committee's ability to secure favorable floor action by the total chamber 
on the bills it reports favorably" (1975, 1). David Ray identifies permissiveness and committee 
floor success to be "the two most fundamental aspects of a committee's legislative effectiveness" 
(1986, 127). All of these criteria are focused on the ability of legislative committees to control 
how far its bills get in the legislative process, rather than on the merits of the policy contained in 
the bills that pass through these committees. 
 Although there have not been any significant in-depth comparative studies of joint 
committees in state legislatures, some political scientists have conducted broad research and case 
studies of joint committees. John A. Fairlie argues that state legislatures could be improved "by 
further reduction in the number of committees, by a more careful and better balanced assignment 
of measures, and by a greater use of joint committees or at least of joint hearings by committees 
of both houses" (1932, 37). Wayne L. Francis and James W. Riddlesperger studied the extent to 
which chamber size has an effect upon the optimal number and size of state legislative 
committees and found that legislators from states with complete joint committee systems express 
dissatisfaction with the operation of their committee systems much more frequently than other 
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legislators (1982, 469). According to Francis, the most frequent complaints from legislators in 
states with complete joint committee systems come from senators and include: "(1) the number 
of committee assignments; (2) the size of committees; and (3) the scheduling of committee 
meetings" (1989, 120).  
In addition, David B. Ogle conducted a case study of joint committee operations in the 
Connecticut General Assembly and found a number of advantages and disadvantages to its joint 
committee system. The advantages include: the elimination of a certain amount of duplication; 
more continuity and coordination between sessional and interim work; identical jurisdictional 
breakdowns in each house; only one hearing before the Legislature for executive agencies; the 
opportunity for members of each house to have an opportunity for a give-and-take and an 
exchange of views with members of the other house; and bills are immediately added to the 
calendar of the second house after passing the first house and are only referred back to 
committee if the second house votes to send them there (Ogle 1974, 171). The disadvantages 
include: joint committees become quite large in size, which can become a hindrance to effective 
legislative action; and the usual double scrutiny of a bill is eliminated when it is not sent to 
committee before being considered in the second house. Despite these disadvantages, Ogle 
argues, "all of the benefits are derived without giving up any of the prerogatives that would 
ordinarily rest with single-house committees" (1974, 171). 
 
What to Expect 
The existing research on joint committees in state legislatures is fairly broad and is 
mostly focused on case studies and the advantages and disadvantages of such a committee 
system. There are currently no significant in-depth studies that use both empirical data and 
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qualitative analysis to compare state legislatures that primarily use joint committees to state 
legislatures that primarily use traditional bicameral committees. I intend to fill this gap through 
my own in-depth study in the following chapters that will compare the joint committee system 
primarily used in the Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts state legislatures to the traditional 
bicameral committee system primarily used in the New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island 
state legislatures. Part of this study will use qualitative methods to compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of both state legislative committee systems, which is similar to the methods used 
by Fairlie (1932, 37), Francis and Riddlesperger (1984, 469), and Ogle (1974). The other part of 
this study will use quantitative methods to compare the number of House and Senate bills 
passing both chambers to the number passing one chamber only, which is similar to the methods 
used by Clem (1978, 1) in his study of the committee system in the South Dakota state 
legislature. 
This in-depth study will be organized as follows: Chapter 2 will present profiles of each 
of the New England state legislatures, which include basic institutional characteristics and a 
breakdown of each state’s legislative committee structure. Chapter 3 will present an overview of 
the legislative process in the New England states with a focus on the procedural differences 
between legislatures that primarily use joint committees and legislatures that primarily use 
traditional bicameral committees. Chapter 4 will present an overview of conference committees 
and analyze them as a pre-existing form of joint standing committees in traditional state 
legislatures. Chapter 5 will present an analysis of empirical data that compares the ratio of bills 
that pass both chambers to the number of bills that pass only one chamber in state legislatures 
that primarily use joint committees to state legislatures that primarily use traditional bicameral 
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committees. Chapter 6 will present a conclusion of my findings and recommendations for what 
state legislatures can do to operate more effectively.  
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Chapter 2: New England State Legislature Profiles 
 For my analysis of joint committees, I chose to focus on the other New England states of 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont in addition to the joint committee states of 
Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts. In this chapter, I will discuss why I selected these states 
to analyze and provide specific background information regarding the legislatures in the states. I 
have organized this background information into profiles for each of the New England states, 
each of which includes a breakdown of the specific committees utilized by each chamber in each 
state's legislature.  
I selected the New England states because of their shared history and unique political 
culture. The New England states share a common heritage, which stems from settlement efforts 
by the English beginning in 1620 (O'Keefe 2014). Like the other original colonies, New England 
was originally an economic venture but “took on a distinct character from the prominence of 
religious dissidents among the earliest settlers" (O'Keefe 2014). These early communities formed 
local institutions to govern themselves and gave individual citizens a fair amount of political 
autonomy, which helped shape the institutions that govern these states today (O'Keefe 2014). 
 The unique political culture of the New England states is commonly exemplified by the 
town meeting, which is considered to be one of the only direct democracy institutions still in use 
in the United States (Zimmerman 1999, xii). The New England town meeting puts the power of 
local lawmaking directly in the hands of voters, with no intermediaries in place between the 
voters and public decisions (Zimmerman 1999, xii). It has been said that public hearings at the 
state legislative level in this region can be looked upon as a form of participatory democracy that 
is rooted in the concept of New England town meeting, at least in the case of Connecticut (Satter 
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2004, 90). The state legislatures in New England definitely seem to welcome public participation 
in the process, especially in comparison to the U.S. Congress. 
 The modern political culture of the New England states has a strong Democratic 
advantage, which stems from the fact that national issues tend to dominate the public's view of 
political parties and national issues and forces tend to have strong impacts on statewide and local 
elections (Curry 2008, 6-7). The influence of national issues and forces makes it especially 
difficult for local Republicans to win legislative majorities in the fairly liberal and moderate 
constituencies of New England because voters often associate them with the conservatism of the 
national Republican Party (Curry 2008, 7). It seems to me that this disconnect is more often 
overcome in statewide Congressional races, at least prior to 2006, and gubernatorial races than in 
state legislative races. This national influence helps create a regional political system in New 
England that promotes and perpetuates the domination of the Democratic Party and liberal policy 
preferences and forces Republicans to demonstrate their moderation in separation from the 
national party (Curry 2008, 7). Below are profiles of the New England state legislatures, which 
include information about the partisan makeup of these institutions, starting with state 
legislatures and mainly use joint committees. 
 
States That Use Joint Committees 
Connecticut 
The Connecticut General Assembly is a part-time, professional legislature that consists of 
two chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate has 36 members who 
are elected from single districts of approximately 94,000 people. The House has 151 members 
who are elected from single districts of approximately 22,000 people (Satter 2004, 18). The 
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Senate is led by the President pro tempore and the House is led by the Speaker of the House. 
Senators and representatives are elected for two-year terms and are paid an annual salary of 
$28,000 plus travel expenses. Members of the leadership receive higher salaries. Legislators 
generally serve part-time and have jobs in their communities in addition to their legislative duties 
(Satter 2004, 19). 
The General Assembly meets in regular session for five months (from January to June) in 
odd numbered years and for three months (from February to May) in even numbered years 
(Satter 2004, 19). Legislators are allowed to pre-file bills, which must be submitted within the 
first 10 days of session in odd numbered years or the first three days in even numbered years. 
These deadlines can be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house or by 
the leadership through the emergency certification process. Bills that are not acted upon do not 
carry over from session to session and must be reintroduced each session (Council of State 
Governments 2013, 92-4).  
There are 21 joint standing committees, 3 joint statutory committees, and 2 joint select 
committees (Council of State Governments 2013, 112-3; Connecticut General Assembly 2012). 
The members and chairpersons of these committees are appointed by the presiding officers of 
each chamber, who accept the nominations of minority party committee members from the 
minority party leaders of each chamber. Each committee has a chair and vice chair from the 
majority party of each chamber and a ranking member from the minority party of each chamber 
(Satter 2009, 88). The committees and their membership are listed in the table below.  
Table  2A: Connecticut Legislative Committees* 
Joint	  Standing	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	  
Sena-­‐
tors	  
Represent-­‐
atives	  
Aging	   13	   9	   4	   3	   10	  
Appropriations	   55	   36	   19	   11	   44	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Banks	   18	   12	   6	   3	   15	  
Commerce	   19	   12	   7	   4	   15	  
Education	   33	   21	   12	   6	   27	  
Energy	  and	  Technology	   23	   15	   8	   3	   20	  
Environment	   30	   20	   10	   3	   27	  
Executive	  and	  Legislative	  
Nominations	   18	   12	   6	   8	   10	  
Finance,	  Revenue	  and	  Bonding	   52	   34	   18	   10	   42	  
General	  Law	   18	   12	   6	   5	   13	  
Government	  Administration	  and	  
Elections	   15	   10	   5	   3	   12	  
Higher	  Education	  and	  
Employment	  Advancement	   20	   13	   7	   3	   17	  
Housing	   11	   7	   4	   3	   8	  
Human	  Services	   18	   12	   6	   3	   15	  
Insurance	  and	  Real	  Estate	   20	   13	   7	   3	   17	  
Judiciary	   45	   29	   16	   10	   35	  
Labor	  and	  Public	  Employees	   11	   7	   4	   3	   8	  
Planning	  and	  Development	   21	   13	   8	   3	   18	  
Public	  Health	   28	   18	   10	   6	   22	  
Public	  Safety	  and	  Security	   25	   16	   9	   5	   20	  
Regulation	  Review	   15	   8	   7	   6	   9	  
Transportation	   38	   25	   13	   9	   29	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Joint	  Statutory	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	  
Sena-­‐
tors	  
Represent-­‐
atives	  
Internship	   12	   6	   6	   6	   6	  
Legislative	  Management	   29	   19	   10	   11	   18	  
Program	  Review	  and	  
Investigations	   12	   6	   6	   6	   6	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Joint	  Select	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	  
Sena-­‐
tors	  
Represent-­‐
atives	  
Select	  Veterans'	  Affairs	   10	   7	   3	   3	   7	  
Select	  Children	   12	   8	   4	   3	   9	  
 *(Connecticut General Assembly 2013a) 
The Senate and House have both been under Democratic control since 1997. Between 
1995 and 2010 the governor was a Republican and since 2011 the governor has been a Democrat 
(Lucy Burns Institute 2014). During the 2009-2010 legislature, legislators introduced 3,925 bills, 
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both chambers enacted 448 bills into law, and the governor vetoed 32 bills, seven of which were 
overridden by the House and Senate (Council of State Governments 2010, 147-8; Council of 
State Governments 2011, 110). In the Senate, 24 senators were Democrats and 12 were 
Republicans. In the House, 114 representatives were Democrats and 37 were Republicans 
(Council of State Governments 2010, 101). During the 2011-2012 legislature, legislators 
introduced 3,132 bills, both chambers enacted 273 bills into law, and the governor did not veto 
any bills (Council of State Governments 2012, 163). In the Senate, 22 senators were Democrats 
and 14 were Republicans. In the House, 99 representatives were Democrats and 52 were 
Republicans (Council of State Governments 2012, 118).  
 
Maine 
The Maine State Legislature is a part-time, citizen legislature that consists of two 
chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 78). The 
Senate has 35 members who are elected from single districts of approximately 37,000. The 
House has 151 members who are elected from single districts of approximately 9,000. In 
addition, the House has two nonvoting members who represent the state's Native American 
population (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). The Senate is led by the President of the Senate and the 
House is led by the Speaker of the House (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 126). Senators and 
representatives are elected for two-year terms and are paid $13,852 for the first session, $9,661 
for the second session, $38 per day for travel expenses, and $32 per day for meals (Lucy Burns 
Institute 2014). Since their salary is so low, only 2.1% of Maine legislators list full-time 
legislator as their occupation, which means they likely have jobs in their communities in addition 
to their legislative duties (National Conference of State Legislatures 2007a). 
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The legislature meets in regular session for eight months (from December to July) in odd 
numbered years, for what is known as the first session, (Council of State Governments 2012, 
163) and five months (from January to May) in even numbered years, for what is known as the 
second session (Council of State Governments 2013, 104). Legislators are allowed to pre-file 
bills, which must be submitted before the cloture date established by the Legislative Council 
(Council of State Governments 2013, 92-4). In the 2009 session, this cloture date was January 
16, which was approximately one month into the session. The cloture deadline can be overridden 
by a majority vote of the Legislative Council (Council of State Governments 2013, 94). Bills that 
are not acted upon during the first session are allowed to carry over into the second session 
(Council of State Governments 2013, 92).  
There are 17 joint standing committees, 2 joint select committees, and a joint 
Government Oversight Committee. In addition, the Senate has 5 standing committees and the 
House has 6 standing committees (Council of State Governments 2013, 112). These separate 
chamber committees mainly deal with procedural and chamber specific matters (Maine State 
Legislature 2013a). Committee members and chairpersons are appointed by the Senate President 
and the Speaker of the House (Council of State Governments 2013, 112). Each committee has a 
chairperson selected from the majority party of each chamber and a single ranking member from 
the minority party from one of the two chambers (Maine State Legislature 2013a). The 
committees and their membership are listed in the table below.   
Table  2B: Maine Legislative Committees* 
Joint	  Standing	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	  
Sena-­‐
tors	  
Represent-­‐
atives	  
Agriculture,	  Conservation	  and	  
Forestry	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Appropriations	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Criminal	  Justice	  and	  Public	  Safety	   13	   7	   6	   3	   10	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Education	  and	  Cultural	  Affairs	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Energy,	  Utilities	  and	  Technology	   13	   7	   6	   3	   10	  
Environment	  and	  Natural	  Resources	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Health	  and	  Human	  Services	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Inland	  Fisheries	  and	  Wildlife	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Insurance	  and	  Financial	  Services	   13	   7	   6	   3	   10	  
Judiciary	   13	   7	   6	   3	   10	  
Labor,	  Commerce,	  Research	  and	  
Economic	  Development	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Marine	  Resources	   13	   7	   6	   3	   10	  
State	  and	  Local	  Government	   13	   7	   6	   3	   10	  
Taxation	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Transportation	   13	   8	   5	   3	   10	  
Veterans	  and	  Legal	  Affairs	   13	   7	   6	   3	   10	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Joint	  Select	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	  
Sena-­‐
tors	  
Represent-­‐
atives	  
Joint	  Rules	   10	   6	   4	   5	   5	  
Regulatory	  Fairness	  and	  Reform	   15	   9	   6	   5	   10	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Government	  Oversight	  Committee	   12	   6	   6	   6	   6	  
*(Maine State Legislature 2013a) 
Between 2003 and 2010, both the Senate and House were under Democratic control. In 
2011 and 2012, the Republicans gained control of both chambers. In 2013, both chambers went 
back to the Democrats. Between 2003 and 2010 the governor was a Democrat and since 2011 the 
governor has been a Republican (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). During the 123rd Legislature 
(2009-2010), legislators introduced 1,832 bills, both chambers enacted 908 bills into law, and the 
governor vetoed only 1 bill (Council of State Governments 2010, 147; Council of State 
Governments 2011, 110). In the Senate, 20 senators were Democrats and 15 were Republicans. 
In the House, 96 representatives were Democrats, 54 representatives were Republicans, and 1 
representative was unenrolled (Council of State Governments 2010, 101-2). During the 124th 
Legislature (2011-2012), legislators introduced 1,913 bills, both chambers enacted 897 bills, and 
the governor vetoed 24 bills (Council of State Governments 2012, 163; Council of State 
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Governments 2013, 104). In the Senate, 14 senators were Democrats, 20 senators were 
Republicans, and 1 senator was unenrolled. In the House, 72 representatives were Democrats, 78 
representatives were Republicans, and 1 representative was unenrolled (Council of State 
Governments 2011, 83-4). 
 
Massachusetts 
 The General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a full-time, professional 
legislature that consists of two chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives (Squire 
and Moncrief 2009, 79). The Senate has 40 members who are elected from single districts of 
approximately 164,000 people. The House has 160 members who are elected from single 
districts of approximately 41,000 people (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). The Senate is led by the 
President of the Senate and the House is led by the Speaker of the House (Squire and Moncrief 
2009, 126). Senators and representatives are elected for two-year terms and are paid an annual 
salary of $61,133 plus between $10 and $100 per diem, depending upon their distance from the 
state house (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). Since the legislature meets year-round and salaries are 
so high by legislative standards, 57.7% of Massachusetts legislators list full-time legislator as 
their occupation (National Conference of State Legislatures 2007a). 
 The General Court meets in regular session each year from January through December 
(Council of State Governments 2013, 104). Each General Court is made up of two sessions, one 
odd numbered year and one even numbered year (Massachusetts General Court 2013). 
Legislators are allowed to pre-file bills, which must be submitted by the first Wednesday in 
November in odd numbered years and the first Wednesday in December in even numbered years. 
This deadline can be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the members present and voting (Council 
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of State Governments 2013, 92-4). Bills that are not acted upon during the first session of each 
General Court are allowed to carry over into the second session (Council of State Governments 
2013, 92). 
 There are 27 joint standing committees, 7 Senate standing committees, and 9 House 
standing committees (Council of State Governments 2013, 112). Each committee has a chair and 
vice chair from the majority party of each chamber and it is unclear if any minority party 
members are designated as ranking members (Massachusetts General Court 2014). Although 
Massachusetts primarily uses joint committees to consider legislation, the separate Senate and 
House committees are used to consider important pieces of legislation. Most appropriations bills 
are considered by the separate House and Senate Ways and Means committees, rather than the 
joint Ways and Means Committee. It appears that the joint Ways and Means Committee is 
mainly used to hold joint public hearings, especially during the budget process (Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts 2013). The joint Ways and Means Committee is made up of the members from 
both the House and Senate Ways and Means committees (Massachusetts General Court 2013). 
The other separate House and Senate committees mainly deal with procedural matters that are 
specific to each individual chamber (Massachusetts General Court 2013). Committee members 
and chairpersons are appointed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
(Council of State Governments 2013, 112). The committees and their membership are listed in 
the table below. 
Table 2C: Massachusetts Legislative Committee Membership* 
Joint	  Standing	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	  
Sena-­‐
tors	  
Represent-­‐
atives	  
Children,	  Families	  and	  Persons	  
With	  Disabilities	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Community	  Development	  and	  
Small	  Businesses	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	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Consumer	  Protection	  and	  
Professional	  Licensure	   17	   17	   3	   6	   11	  
Economic	  Development	  and	  
Emerging	  Technologies	   20	   17	   3	   7	   13	  
Education	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Elder	  Affairs	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Election	  Laws	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Environment,	  Natural	  Resources	  
and	  Agriculture	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Financial	  Services	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Health	  Care	  Financing	   20	   17	   3	   7	   13	  
Higher	  Education	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Housing	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Judiciary	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Labor	  and	  Workforce	  Development	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Mental	  Health	  and	  Substance	  
Abuse	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Municipalities	  and	  Regional	  
Government	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Public	  Health	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Public	  Safety	  and	  Homeland	  
Security	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Public	  Service	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Revenue	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Rules	   21	   16	   5	   6	   15	  
State	  Administration	  and	  
Regulatory	  Oversight	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Telecommunications,	  Utilities	  and	  
Energy	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Tourism,	  Arts	  and	  Cultural	  
Development	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Transportation	   20	   17	   3	   7	   13	  
Veterans	  and	  Federal	  Affairs	   17	   14	   3	   6	   11	  
Ways	  and	  Means	   48	   41	   7	   16	   32	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Senate	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	   	   	  
Bills	  in	  the	  Third	  Reading	   5	   4	   1	   	   	  
Bonding,	  Capital	  Expenditures	  and	  
State	  Assets	   6	   5	   1	   	   	  
Post	  Audit	  and	  Oversight	   7	   6	   1	   	   	  
Ethics	  and	  Rules	   6	   4	   2	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Global	  Warming	  and	  Climate	  
Change	   6	   5	   1	   	   	  
Steering	  and	  Policy	   5	   4	   1	   	   	  
Ways	  and	  Means	   17	   15	   2	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
House	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	   	   	  
Rules	   15	   12	   3	   	   	  
Ways	  and	  Means	   32	   26	   6	   	   	  
Bills	  in	  the	  Third	  Reading	   3	   2	   1	   	   	  
Ethics	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Personnel	  and	  Administration	   13	   9	   4	   	   	  
Post	  Audit	  and	  Oversight	   11	   9	   2	   	   	  
Steering,	  Policy	  and	  Scheduling	   11	   9	   2	   	   	  
Bonding,	  Capital	  Expenditures	  and	  
State	  Assets	   11	   9	   2	   	   	  
Global	  Warming	  and	  Climate	  
Change	   11	   9	   2	   	   	  
 *(Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2013; Lucy Burns Institute 2014) 
Between 1992 and 2006 the governor was a Republican and since 2007 the governor has 
been a Democrat (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). During the 186th General Court (2009-2010), 
legislators introduced 12,209 bills, both chambers enacted 680 bills into law, and the governor 
vetoed only 1 bill (Council of State Governments 2010, 147; Council of State Governments 
2011, 110). In the Senate, 35 senators were Democrats and 5 senators were Republicans. In the 
House, 143 representatives were Democrats, 16 representatives were Republicans, and 1 
representative was an independent (Council of State Governments 2010, 101-2). During the 
187th General Court (2011-2012), legislators introduced 13,331 bills, both chambers enacted 917 
bills into law, and the governor vetoed 5 bills (Council of State Governments 2012, 163; Council 
of State Governments 2013, 104). In the Senate, 36 senators were Democrats and 4 senators were 
Republicans. In the House, 128 representatives were Democrats, 31 representatives were 
Republicans, and there was 1 vacancy (Council of State Governments 2011, 83). 
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States That Use Traditional Bicameral Committees 
New Hampshire 
 The New Hampshire General Court is a part-time, citizen legislature that consists of two 
chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 79). The 
Senate has 24 members who are elected from single districts of approximately 55,000 people. 
The House has 400 members who are elected from single districts of approximately 4,000 people 
(Lucy Burns Institute 2014). The Senate is led by the President of the Senate and the House is 
led by the Speaker of the House (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 126). Senators and representatives 
are elected for two-year terms and are paid $200 per term plus travel expenses (Council of State 
Governments 2013, 72). Since New Hampshire legislative salaries are the lowest in the nation, 
only 0.5% of legislators list full-time legislator as their occupation (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2007a). New Hampshire legislators need an outside job in order to make a living. 
 The General Court meets in regular session for six months (from January to July) in odd 
numbered years and five months (from January to June) in even numbered years (Lucy Burns 
Institute 2014). Legislators are allowed to pre-file bills, which must be submitted by a 
predetermined deadline determined by the rules of each chamber at the beginning of each 
session. This deadline can be overridden by a two-thirds vote of members present (Council of 
State Governments 2013, 94). Bills that are not acted upon during the first session of each 
General Court are allowed to carry over into the second session (Council of State Governments 
2013, 92). 
 There are 11 Senate standing committees and 21 House standing committees (Lucy Burns 
Institute 2014). Committee members and chairpersons are appointed by the President of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House in consultation with minority leaders (Council of State 
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Governments 2013, 112-3). Each committee has a chairperson and vice chairperson selected 
from the majority party committee members and one committee member is selected to serve as 
the committee’s clerk. It is unclear if any minority party members are designated as ranking 
members (New Hampshire General Court 2014). The committees and their membership are 
listed in the table below. 
Table  2D: New Hampshire Legislative Committees* 
House	  Standing	  Committees	   Total	  Members	   Majority	  Party	   Minority	  Party	  
Children	  and	  Family	  Law	   17	   13	   4	  
Commerce	  and	  Consumer	  Affairs	   18	   14	   4	  
Criminal	  Justice	  and	  Public	  Safety	   17	   13	   4	  
Education	   17	   13	   4	  
Election	  Law	   17	   13	   4	  
Environment	  and	  Agriculture	   18	   13	   5	  
Executive	  Departments	  and	  Administration	   16	   12	   4	  
Finance	   26	   20	   6	  
Fish	  and	  Game	  and	  Marine	  Resources	   17	   12	   5	  
Health,	  Human	  Services	  and	  Elderly	  Affairs	   18	   13	   5	  
Judiciary	   17	   13	   4	  
Labor,	  Industrial	  and	  Rehabilitative	  Services	   17	   13	   4	  
Legislative	  Administration	   20	   15	   5	  
Municipal	  and	  County	  Governments	   17	   13	   4	  
Public	  Works	  and	  Highways	   18	   13	   5	  
Resources,	  Recreation	  and	  Development	   17	   12	   5	  
Rules	   9	   7	   2	  
Science,	  Technology	  and	  Energy	   18	   12	   6	  
State-­‐Federal	  Relations	  and	  Veterans	  
Affairs	   17	   12	   5	  
Transportation	   17	   12	   5	  
Ways	  and	  Means	   21	   16	   5	  
	   	   	   	  
Senate	  Standing	  Committees	   Total	  Members	   Majority	  Party	   Minority	  Party	  
Capital	  Budget	   6	   5	   1	  
Commerce	   6	   5	   1	  
Energy	  and	  Natural	  Resources	   5	   4	   1	  
Executive	  Departments	  and	  Administration	   5	   4	   1	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Finance	   7	   6	   1	  
Health,	  Education	  and	  Human	  Services	   5	   4	   1	  
Judiciary	   4	   3	   1	  
Public	  and	  Municipal	  Affairs	   5	   4	   1	  
Rules,	  Enrolled	  Bills	  and	  Internal	  Affairs	   5	   4	   1	  
Transportation	   5	   4	   1	  
Ways	  and	  Means	   6	   5	   1	  
 *(Lucy Burns Institute 2014) 
 Looking at the above table, it is obvious that there is not much overlap between House 
and Senate committee names. Both the Senate and House have the following committees: 
Finance, Government Oversight, Judiciary, Labor, and Rules. Executive Departments and 
Administration, Finance, Judiciary, Transportation, and Ways and Means. Both chambers also 
have committees with similar names that cover similar subject areas. The Senate has a 
Commerce Committee, while the House has a Commerce and Consumer Affairs Committee that 
covers a similar subject area. The Senate has a Health, Education and Human Services 
Committee, while the House has separate Education and Health, Human Services and Elderly 
Affairs committees that cover the same subject area. The Senate has a Public and Municipal 
Affairs Committee, while the House has a Municipal and County Government Committee that 
covers a similar subject area. Finally, the Senate has a Rules, Enrolled Bills and Internal Affairs 
Committee, while the House has a Rules Committee that covers the same subject area. 
The rest of the committees do not seem to have a similar counterpart in the other chamber. For 
example, it is unclear where a bill from the House Labor, Industrial and Rehabilitative Services 
Committee would be referred once it reaches the Senate. If the bill in question concerned a labor 
issue, it would likely be referred to the Senate Commerce Committee, but if it concerned a 
rehabilitative services issue, it may be referred to the Senate Health, Education and Human 
Services Committee. This disconnect between Senate and House committees means that 
members of each of the committees that consider a particular bill will have vastly different levels 
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of expertise on the issue in question. Since House committees seem to cover more specialized 
subject areas, it is likely that the Senate committees might defer to the expertise of House 
committees on bills relating to these specialized subject areas. More discussion of this subject 
can be found in Chapter 3. 
 Between 2007 and 2010, both the Senate and House were under Democratic control. In 
2011 and 2012, both chambers were under Republican control. Currently, the Senate is under 
Republican control and the House is under Democratic control. Since 2005, the governor has 
been a Democrat (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). During the 2009-2010 General Court, legislators 
introduced 1,687 bills, both chambers enacted 710 bills into law, and the governor vetoed 15 
bills (Council of State Governments 2010, 147; Council of State Governments 2011, 110). In the 
Senate, 14 senators were Democrats and 10 were Republicans. In the House, 225 representatives 
were Democrats and 175 were Republicans (Council of State Governments 2010, 101). During 
the 2011-2012 General Court, legislators introduced 1,714 bills, both chambers enacted 555 bills 
into law, and the governor vetoed 21 bills (Council of State Governments 2012, 163; Council of 
State Governments 2013, 104). In the Senate, 5 senators were Democrats and 19 were 
Republicans. In the House, 104 representatives were Democrats and 292 were Republicans 
(Council of State Governments 2012, 118). 
 
Rhode Island 
 The Rhode Island General Assembly is a part-time, amateur legislature that consists of 
two chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 79-81). 
The Senate has 38 members who are elected from single districts of approximately 28,000 
people. The House has 75 members who are elected from single districts of approximately 
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15,000 people (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). The Senate is led by the President pro tempore and 
the House is led by the Speaker of the House (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 126). Senators and 
representatives are elected for two-year terms (Lucy Burns Institute 2014) and are paid an annual 
salary of $14,640 plus travel expenses (Council of State Governments 2013, 72). Since the 
legislative pay is so low, zero legislators list full-time legislator as an occupation, which means 
they likely have jobs in their communities in addition to their legislative duties in order to make 
a living (National Conference of State Legislatures 2007b). 
 The General Assembly meets in regular session for six months (from January to July) in 
odd numbered years and for five months (from January to June) in even numbered years (Lucy 
Burns Institute 2014). Legislators are allowed to pre-file bills, which must be submitted by the 
second week of February. This deadline can be overridden if the sponsor gives the legislature 
one legislative day’s notice. Bills that are not acted upon during regular session in odd-numbered 
years are allowed to carry over to the next year's regular session (Council of State Governments 
2013, 92-4). 
 There are 10 Senate standing committees, 11 House standing committees, and 3 joint 
standing committees. Committee members and chairpersons are appointed by the Senate 
President pro tempore and the Speaker of the House (Council of State Governments 2013, 112). 
Each committee has a chairperson and vice chairperson selected from the majority party 
committee members and one committee member is selected to serve as the committee’s secretary 
(Lucy Burns Institute 2014). The committees and their membership are listed in the table below. 
Table  2E: Rhode Island Legislative Committees* 
House	  Standing	  Committees	   Total	  Members	   Majority	  Party	   Minority	  Party	  
Corporations	   13	   11	   2	  
Environment	  and	  Natural	  Resources	   11	   9	   2	  
Finance	   16	   13	   3	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Health,	  Education	  and	  Welfare	   13	   11	   2	  
Judiciary	   14	   12	   2	  
Labor	   13	   11	   2	  
Municipal	  Government	   14	   12	   2	  
Oversight	   11	   9	   2	  
Rules	   10	   8	   2	  
Small	  Business	   11	   9	   2	  
Veterans'	  Affairs	   12	   10	   2	  
	   	   	   	  
Senate	  Standing	  Committees	   Total	  Members	   Majority	  Party	   Minority	  Party	  
Commerce	   10	   6	   4	  
Education	   7	   5	   2	  
Environment	  and	  Agriculture	   7	   5	   2	  
Finance	   10	   8	   2	  
Government	  Oversight	   8	   6	   2	  
Health	  and	  Human	  Services	   8	   7	   1	  
Housing	  and	  Municipal	  Government	   8	   7	   1	  
Judiciary	   10	   8	   2	  
Labor	   8	   6	   2	  
Rules	   6	   5	   1	  
Special	  Legislation	  and	  Veterans'	  Affairs	   9	   7	   2	  
*(Lucy Burns Institute 2014) 
 Looking at the table above, it appears that both the Senate and House committees are 
divided up into comparable subject areas. Both the Senate and House have the following 
committees: Finance, Government Oversight, Judiciary, Labor, and Rules. Both chambers also 
have committees with slightly different names the cover similar subject areas. The Senate has a 
Commerce Committee, while the House has separate Corporations and Small Business 
committees that cover the same subject area. The House has a Health, Education and Welfare 
Committee, while the Senate has separate Education and Health and Human Services committees 
that cover the same subject area. The Senate has an Environment and Agriculture Committee, 
while the House has an Environment and Agriculture Committee that covers a similar subject 
area. The Senate has a Housing and Municipal Government Committee, while the House has a 
Municipal Government Committee that covers a similar subject area. Finally, the House has a 
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Veterans’ Affairs Committee, while the Senate has a Special Legislation and Veterans’ Affairs 
Committee that covers a similar subject area. In comparison to New Hampshire, the division of 
committees in the separate chambers of the Rhode Island State Legislature is much more 
straightforward and complementary. Therefore, the members of the Senate committees are more 
likely to have the same level of expertise on the issues before their committee as their House 
counterparts. 
 Since 1992, both the Senate and House have been under Democratic control. Between 
1995 and 2010, the governor was a Republican. Since 2011, the governor has been an 
independent, but he recently changed his party affiliation to the Democratic Party (Lucy Burns 
Institute 2014). During the 2009-2010 legislature, legislators introduced 4,749 bills, both 
chambers enacted 917 bills into law, and the governor vetoed 59 bills, 29 of which were 
overridden by the House and Senate (Council of State Governments 2010, 147-8; Council of 
State Governments 2011, 110). In the Senate, 33 senators were Democrats, 4 were Republicans, 
and 1 was an independent. In the House, 69 representatives were Democrats and 6 were 
Republicans (Council of State Governments 2010, 101-2). The Democrats had a super majority 
in both chambers. During the 2011-2012 legislature, legislators introduced 4,794 bills, both 
chambers enacted 1,180 bills into law, and the governor vetoed 20 bills (Council of State 
Governments 2012, 163; Council of State Governments 2013, 104). In the Senate, 29 senators 
were Democrats, 8 were Republicans, and 1 was an independent. In the House, 65 
representatives were Democrats and 10 were Republicans (Council of State Governments 2012, 
118). The Democrats again had a super majority in both chambers. 
 
Vermont 
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 The Vermont State Legislature is a part-time, citizen legislature that consists of two 
chambers: the Senate and House of Representatives (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 78-80). The 
Senate has 30 members who are elected from three single-member districts, six two-member 
districts, three three-member, and one six-member district. Each senator represents 
approximately 21,000 constituents. The House has 150 members who are elected from 66 single-
member districts and 42 two-member districts. Each representative represents approximately 
5,000 constituents (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). The Senate is led by the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the House is led by the Speaker of the House (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 126). 
Senators and representatives are elected for two-year terms (Lucy Burns Institute 2014) and are 
paid $647.12 per week during the legislative session only plus travel and meal expenses (Council 
of State Governments 2013, 73). Only 3.4% of legislators list full-time legislator as their 
occupation, which is consistent with the Vermont State Legislature's categorization as a citizen 
legislature (National Conference of State Legislatures 2007b). 
The legislature meets in regular session each year for approximately 4 months from 
January to May (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). Legislators are allowed to have bills drafted before 
the start of each legislature, but cannot be officially filed until the first day of session (Council of 
State Governments 2013, 92-3). In the House, bills must be filed by the last day of February 
during the first session and by the last day of January during the second session. In the Senate, 
bills must be filed by the 53rd calendar day of session during the first session and 25 calendar 
days before the start of the second session. This deadline can be overridden with approval from 
the Rules Committee (Council of State Governments 2013, 96). Bills that are not acted upon 
during the first session are allowed to carry over into the second session (Council of State 
Governments 2013, 92).  
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 There are 12 Senate standing committees, 15 House standing committees, and 13 joint 
standing committees (Council of State Governments 2013, 112). Committee members and 
chairpersons are appointed by a Committee on Committees in the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House in the House (Council of State Governments 2013, 112). Each committee has a 
chairperson and vice chairperson selected from the majority party committee members, a ranking 
member selected from the minority party committee members, and one committee member is 
selected to serve as the committee’s clerk. Although Vermont has joint committees, they do not 
appear to have any legislative authority and mainly function as oversight committees that meet 
both during and between legislative sessions (Vermont General Assembly 2014). According to 
the joint rules, Senate and House committees that cover similar subject areas are allowed to meet 
together as joint committees for the purpose of public hearings, but must take action separately 
and report only to their respective houses (Vermont General Assembly 2014).  The committees 
and their membership are listed in the table below. 
Table  2F: Vermont Legislative Committees* 
House	  Standing	  Committees	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	   	   	  
Agriculture	  and	  Forest	  Products	   11	   6	   5	   	   	  
Appropriations	   12	   7	   5	   	   	  
Commerce	  and	  Economic	  
Development	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Corrections	  and	  Institutions	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Education	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Fish,	  Wildlife	  &	  Water	  Resources	   9	   6	   3	   	   	  
General,	  Housing	  and	  Military	  
Affairs	   8	   5	   3	   	   	  
Government	  Operations	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Health	  Care	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Human	  Services	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Judiciary	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Natural	  Resources	  &	  Energy	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Rules	   7	   4	   3	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Transportation	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
Ways	  and	  Means	   11	   7	   4	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Senate	  Standing	  Committees	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	   	   	  
Agriculture	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
Appropriations	   7	   5	   2	   	   	  
Economic	  Development,	  Housing	  
and	  General	  Affairs	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
Education	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
Finance	   7	   5	   2	   	   	  
Government	  Operations	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
Health	  and	  Welfare	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
Institutions	   5	   4	   1	   	   	  
Judiciary	   5	   4	   1	   	   	  
Natural	  Resources	  and	  Energy	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
Transportation	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
Rules	   5	   3	   2	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Joint	  Standing	  Committee	   Total	  Members	  
Majority	  
Party	  
Minority	  
Party	  
Sena-­‐
tors	  
Represent-­‐
atives	  
Administrative	  Rules	   8	   5	   3	   4	   4	  
Joint	  Fiscal	   10	   8	   2	   5	   5	  
Joint	  Rules	   7	   5	   2	   4	   3	  
Legislative	  Council	   8	   6	   2	   4	   4	  
Corrections	  Oversight	   9	   7	   2	   4	   5	  
Energy	   7	   5	   2	   4	   3	  
Government	  Accountability	   12	   9	   3	   6	   6	  
Health	  Access	  Oversight	   9	   7	   2	   4	   5	  
Judicial	  Retention	   8	   6	   2	   4	   4	  
Judicial	  Rules	   8	   4	   4	   4	   4	  
Legislative	  Information	  Technology	   8	   4	   4	   4	   4	  
Mental	  Health	  Oversight	   7	   5	   2	   3	   4	  
Transportation	  Oversight	   6	   5	   1	   3	   3	  
*(Lucy Burns Institute 2014) 
 Looking at the table above, it appears that the Senate and House committees are divided 
up into complementary subject areas. The Senate and House both have the following committees 
in common: Appropriations, Education, Government Operations, Judiciary, Natural Resources 
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and Energy, Transportation, and Rules. Both chambers also have committees with slightly 
different names that cover similar subject areas. The Senate has an Agriculture Committee, while 
the House has separate Agriculture and Forest Products and Fish, Wildlife and Water Resources 
committees that cover the same subject areas. The Senate has an Economic Development, 
Housing and General Affairs Committee, while the House has separate General, Housing and 
Military Affairs and Commerce and Economic Development committees that cover a similar 
subject area. The Senate has a Finance Committee, while the House has a Ways and Means 
Committee that deals with similar financial matters. The Senate has a Health and Welfare 
Committee, while the House has separate Health Care and Human Services committees that 
cover a similar subject area. Finally, the House has a Corrections and Institutions Committee, 
while the Senate has an Institutions Committee that covers a similar subject area. Like Rhode 
Island, the House and Senate committees of the Vermont State Legislature definitely seem to be 
divided into similar subject areas that complement each other. Therefore, the members of the 
Senate committees are likely to have the same amount of expertise on the issues they deal with 
as their House counterparts. 
 Since 2005, both the Senate and House have been under Democratic control. Between 
2003 and 2010, the governor was a Republican. Since 2011, the governor has been a Democrat 
(Lucy Burns Institute 2014). During the 2009-2010 Legislature, legislators introduced 940 bills, 
both chambers enacted 145 bills into law, and the governor vetoed 3 bills, 1 of which was 
overridden by the Senate and House (Council of State Governments 2010, 147-8; Council of 
State Governments 2011, 110-1). In the Senate, 23 senators were Democrats and 7 were 
Republicans. In the House, 95 representatives were Democrats, 48 were Republicans, 2 were 
independents, and 5 were Progressives (Council of State Governments 2010, 101-2). During the 
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2011-2012 Legislature, legislators introduced 1,047 bills, both chambers enacted 188 bills into 
law, and the governor vetoed 2 bills (Council of State Governments 2012, 163; Council of State 
Governments 2013, 104). In the Senate, 21 senators were Democrats, 8 were Republicans, and 1 
was a Progressive. In the House, 94 representatives were Democrats, 48 were Republicans, 3 
were independents, and 5 were Progressives (Council of State Governments 2012, 118-9). 
 
Conclusion 
 For this thesis, I chose to include the other New England states of New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont in addition to the joint committee states of Connecticut, Maine, and 
Massachusetts because they all have a shared history and unique political culture. The states 
share a common heritage, which is exemplified by the settlement efforts of English religious 
dissidents who formed local institutions to govern themselves and gave individual citizens a fair 
amount of political autonomy. The unique political culture of these states is characterized by the 
town meeting, which is one of the only direct democracy institutions still used in the United 
States, and a strong Democratic electoral advantage. The purpose of this chapter was to profile 
the individual New England state legislatures and point out their many similarities and 
differences, in addition to just the type of committees they primarily use, in an effort to put into 
perspective the discussion of the legislative process in the quantitative study, which can be found 
in the next chapters.
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Chapter 3: The Legislative Process 
 The legislative process, through which a bill becomes a law, is a time-consuming process 
with many steps that takes place within an institution with many time constraints. Proposed bills 
have to overcome many hurdles and meet a series of deadlines before they reach the governor's 
desk to be enacted into law (Satter 2009, 84). The key to effective legislating is to maximize the 
available time by focusing on proposed bills that are most likely to pass through the committee 
process and the floor of both chambers. The important decision of which bills to focus on is 
typically made early in the committee process. 
 Most tangible legislative work takes place in standing committees, which are permanent 
committees that meet on a regular basis.1 New England state legislatures use both joint standing 
committees and traditional bicameral standing committees to conduct legislative business. Joint 
committees have members from both the Senate and the House of Representatives. These 
committees are co-chaired by both a senator and a representative, who will typically alternate in 
presiding over committee meetings and public hearings (Satter 2009, 23). State legislatures with 
traditional bicameral committees have separate committees for both the Senate and the House. In 
Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts most legislative business is conducted in joint standing 
committees. In New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont most legislative business is 
conducted in traditional bicameral standing committees. 
 This chapter will detail the legislative process of the New England state legislatures, with 
an emphasis on the role of committees. I plan to analyze the differences in the legislative process 
between the states that primarily use joint committees and the states that primarily use traditional 
bicameral committees as well as the consequences of these differences. The overview of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Throughout this work, when I refer to committees or joint committees, assume that I am writing about standing 
committees. If I intend to write about other types of committees, I will specifically refer to them as such. 
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process will be based on how the Connecticut General Assembly operates because I worked 
there as an intern for a semester in 2013 and will include variations for the other New England 
states where applicable. 
 
Introduction of Legislation 
 The first step in the process is the introduction of legislation by a member of the 
legislature. Although ideas for legislation can come from many sources, such as constituents, 
interest groups, lobbyists, or governors, only legislators and legislative committees can officially 
introduce legislation. A piece of legislation is typically drafted in statutory language by staff 
attorneys, who work for the legislature, in the form of a bill (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 168). In 
Maine, the Revisor's Office, Office of Policy and Legal Analysis, and Office of Fiscal and 
Program Review staff provide research and drafting assistance to individual legislators to help 
them prepare a bill in proper technical form (Maine State Legislature 2013b). In New 
Hampshire, the Office of Legislative Services helps individual legislators draft bills (Northeast 
Information Services 2009, 1). Connecticut is a special case because a proposed bill only consists 
of a statement of its substance and purpose in simple, non-statutory language (Satter 2009, 86). 
Connecticut bills can only be officially drafted in statutory language at the request of committees 
or legislative leaders later in the process (Satter 2009, 87). Therefore, legislators in Connecticut 
typically draft bills on their own. In all of these legislatures, legislators are welcome to draft or 
submit bills in full statutory language, but they usually take advantage of the available legal staff 
to take care of it for them. 
 A bill is officially introduced when it is submitted to the clerk of the chamber of the 
primary sponsor, either the House of Representatives or the Senate, which will be referred to as 
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the first chamber (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 173). In Maine, bills are submitted to the clerk of 
the House or the secretary of the Senate (Maine State Legislature 2013b). In Rhode Island, 
prospective bills are submitted to the recording secretary of the House of Representatives or the 
secretary of the Senate (State of Rhode Island General Assembly 2014). Once a bill is officially 
introduced, it is assigned an identification number and "read" to the first chamber for the first 
time. In the interest of time, a bill is not typically read in its entirety, but rather only the bill 
number, sponsor, and title are read (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 173). 
 
The Committee Process 
The committee process is most important because it is where most tangible legislating 
occurs. Since the number of bills introduced each session is so large, legislatures divide up the 
workload for reviewing them among standing committees (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 173). 
During this process, committees "initially screen bills for a semblance of merit; hold hearings to 
allow the public to provide information and express feelings; shape and modify bills to improve 
them and gain consensus; deliberate over them; and finally decide whether or not to recommend 
them to the entire legislature for passage" (Satter 2009, 88). Committees essentially choose the 
most important pieces of legislation and change them in an effort to ensure that they will pass the 
full legislature. The importance of a piece of legislation is a subjective measure that is typically 
based upon how important it is to legislative leaders, the governor, and members of the 
committee in question, namely those in the majority party (Satter 2009, 89). Since legislative 
time is in short supply, committees need to carefully select the pieces of legislation to spend that 
time on, which are those most likely to pass both chambers. 
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Committee Referral 
 First, a bill is referred to the appropriate committee (or committees) based upon its 
subject matter. The committee reference process can be a very important one in terms of the fate 
of a bill. The committee of reference may have a history of rejecting similar bills, or members of 
the committee may have personal objections to the content of certain types of bills (Satter 2009, 
87). Since this process is so important, a bill will sometimes be sent to a committee that does not 
seem to be most appropriate in order to either ensure the legislation has a better chance of 
passing or to ensure the legislation will meet a certain death. In order to be effective, committees 
need to maximize legislative time by focusing on bills that are more likely to pass both chambers 
further along in the process. In state legislatures with traditional bicameral committees, a bill will 
have to be referred to another committee later in the process if it reaches the second chamber for 
consideration. A detailed list of committees and membership numbers for the New England state 
legislatures can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
Legislatures With Joint Committees. In Connecticut, the presiding officer of the first chamber 
makes the committee referral decision. In Maine, the clerk of the House and the secretary of the 
Senate both recommend the committee that seems most appropriate and a floor vote is taken to 
approve this referral decision, which tends to be just a formality in most cases (Maine State 
Legislature 2013b). If there is a disagreement, the final decision is up to the presiding officer of 
the first chamber (Maine State Legislature 2013b). In Massachusetts, the committee referral 
power is in the hands of the clerk or assistant clerk of the first chamber (Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts 2014). 
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 The committee referral process in state legislatures with joint committees is a little more 
straightforward because both chambers choose the committee (or committees) of reference for a 
bill from the same list of committees, no matter the chamber considering the bill. Table 3A 
contains a list of joint standing committees in the Maine State Legislature. For example, if a 
legislator introduced a bill that would legalize bow hunting of deer on Sundays, it would likely 
be referred to the Inland Fisheries and Wildlife Committee, whether the bill is under 
consideration in the House or the Senate. Either way, the bill would go to a committee that has 
expertise in dealing with issues affecting wildlife.  
The process is simpler because the bill only has to be referred to one committee for both 
the Senate and the House. Most importantly, all of the committee members who will consider the 
bill sit on one committee, which means they can easily find a consensus on whether or not a 
particular bill is likely to make it through the committee process. The committee can maximize 
legislative time by focusing on bills on which they are able to reach a consensus and putting 
aside the ones on which they are not. The institutional arrangement of joint committees is more 
conducive to consensus building between chambers. 
Table 3A: Maine Joint Standing Committees* 
Joint	  Standing	  Committee	  
Agriculture,	  Conservation	  and	  
Forestry	   Health	  and	  Human	  Services	   Marine	  Resources	  
Appropriations	  and	  Financial	  
Affairs	   Inland	  Fisheries	  and	  Wildlife	   State	  and	  Local	  Government	  
Criminal	  Justice	  and	  Public	  
Safety	  
Insurance	  and	  Financial	  
Services	   Taxation	  
Education	  and	  Cultural	  Affairs	   Judiciary	   Transportation	  
Energy,	  Utilities	  and	  
Technology	  
Labor,	  Commerce,	  Research	  
and	  Economic	  Development	   Veterans	  and	  Legal	  Affairs	  
*(Maine State Legislature 2013a) 
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Legislatures With Traditional Bicameral Committees. The committee referral process in New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont is a little more complex because the separate chambers 
choose the committee (or committees) of reference from separate lists of committees, depending 
upon the chamber considering the bill. In these state legislatures, this decision is made by the 
presiding officer of the first chamber (Northeast Information Services 2009, 1; State of Rhode 
Island General Assembly 2014; Vermont General Assembly 2014). Table 3B contains a list of 
standing committees in the New Hampshire General Court. For example, if a legislator 
introduced a bill that would legalize bow hunting of deer on Sundays, it would likely be referred 
to the Fish and Game and Marine Resources Committee if under consideration in the House and 
the Energy and Natural Resources Committee if under consideration in the Senate. 
 The process is more involved because the bill has to be referred to separate committees 
for both the Senate and the House. When senators and representatives sit on separate committees, 
it is more difficult to find a consensus on whether or not a particular bill will make it through the 
committee process of both chambers. The separate bicameral committees are unable to maximize 
legislative time because they have to guess what the other chamber’s committee is going to do 
with the bill. The chairperson of the committees in question could meet with each other to find 
out what the other chamber’s committee is going to do with the bill, but this is not as effective as 
having all of the committee members around the same table in a formal setting.  
For example, if the New Hampshire House Health, Human Services and Elderly Affairs 
Committee considered a bill that would legalize assisted suicide, which a majority of its 
members supported, it would seem to be a good use of legislative time to work on the bill and 
eventually give it a favorable committee report. However, a majority of senators on the Senate 
Health, Education and Human Services Committee, which this hypothetical bill would 
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eventually be referred to once it reaches the Senate, have moral objections to supporting the bill. 
The only way that the House committee would find out about the moral objections of these 
senators would be for the chairperson of either of these committees to go out of his or her way to 
talk to the chairperson of the other committee. If these senators and representatives sat together 
on a joint committee, the senators in question would be sure to express their moral objections 
early in the process, which would help the committee members reach the consensus that 
spending more time on an assisted suicide bill that is unlikely to pass both chambers would be a 
waste of precious legislative time.  
For another example, in which a compromise could be reached, the New Hampshire 
Senate Public and Municipal Affairs Committee gives a favorable report to a gun control bill that 
would institute an assault weapons ban and make it illegal for anyone under the age of 21 to 
purchase any type of firearm. The bill is subsequently passed by the Senate and sent on to the 
House for further action. In the House, the bill is referred to the House Criminal Justice and 
Public Safety Committee, where a majority of the committee members are military veterans. 
These members argue that it would be unjust to make it illegal for members of the military under 
the age of 21 to purchase a firearm, when they are trusted to handle firearms to protect their 
fellow citizens. After hearing these objections, the full committee gives the bill a favorable report 
and recommends that it be amended to make it illegal for anyone under the age of 18 to purchase 
any type of firearm, instead of anyone under the age of 21. The House passes the bill with 
recommended amendment and it is sent back to the Senate to consider the bill with the House 
amendment. The Senate can then either accept the amendment, which means the bill would be 
sent directly to the governor, or reject the amendment, which would waste more legislative time 
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and could even force both chambers to convene a conference committee to work out the 
differences.  
If the senators and representatives in this example sat on the same joint committee, the 
representatives in question could have expressed their objections earlier in the process and the 
committee could have amended the bill before it even reached the first chamber for a vote. The 
use of joint committees would have saved precious legislative time by working out a 
compromise earlier in the process. Therefore, the institutional arrangement of traditional 
bicameral committees is less conducive to consensus building and compromise between 
chambers and wastes precious legislative time. 
Table 3B: New Hampshire Standing Committees* 
House	  Standing	  Committees	   Senate	  Standing	  Committees	  
Children	  and	  Family	  Law	   Labor,	  Industrial	  and	  Rehabilitative	  Services	   Capital	  Budget	  
Commerce	  and	  Consumer	  
Affairs	   Legislative	  Administration	   Commerce	  
Criminal	  Justice	  and	  Public	  
Safety	  
Municipal	  and	  County	  
Governments	   Energy	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  
Education	   Public	  Works	  and	  Highways	   Executive	  Departments	  and	  Administration	  
Election	  Law	   Resources,	  Recreation	  and	  Development	   Finance	  
Environment	  and	  Agriculture	   Rules	   Health,	  Education	  and	  Human	  Services	  
Executive	  Departments	  and	  
Administration	  
Science,	  Technology	  and	  
Energy	   Judiciary	  
Finance	   State-­‐Federal	  Relations	  and	  Veterans	  Affairs	   Public	  and	  Municipal	  Affairs	  
Fish	  and	  Game	  and	  Marine	  
Resources	   Transportation	  
Rules,	  Enrolled	  Bills	  and	  
Internal	  Affairs	  
Health,	  Human	  Services	  and	  
Elderly	  Affairs	   Ways	  and	  Means	   Transportation	  
*(Lucy Burns Institute 2014) 
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Public Hearings 
 Next, committees hold public hearings to learn more about the bills that are referred to 
them. The goal of a public hearing is to gauge public sentiment on a prospective piece of 
legislation and to learn information on its substantive merit (Satter 2009, 91). The people who 
testify at public hearings include sponsoring legislators, other interested legislators, 
representatives of state agencies and other state officials, lobbyists, and members of the public 
(Satter 2009, 90). The public hearing stage is the only part of the process during which non-
legislators can officially speak publicly in the legislature on proposed legislation (Squire and 
Moncrief 2009, 175).  
 The main information that legislators hope to gain from hearings include a bill’s practical 
consequences, its costs and the revenue sources for financing it, alternative ways of achieving its 
objectives, and the experience of other states that have enacted similar laws (Satter 2009, 91). 
Although legislators take public hearing testimony into account to a certain extent, they do not 
take it too seriously because it can often present a distorted picture of public sentiment since 
people who feel deeply about certain issues are more likely to speak out (Satter 2009, 91). The 
committee chairperson is pivotal at this stage because he or she typically has final say over when 
(or even if) a bill will be heard (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 175). In Connecticut, at the first 
meeting committee members vote on which bills to subject to public hearings and to have the 
Legislative Commissioners’ Office draft them in statutory form (Satter 2009, 89). 
In regards to public hearings, a joint committee system makes it easier for the public to 
get involved in the legislative process because they only need to attend one hearing to fully get 
involved in the process. In legislatures with traditional bicameral committees, members of the 
public need to attend two separate public hearings, one for both the Senate and House 
	   42 
committees, in order to be fully involved in the process. This extra step is likely to confuse some 
constituents, who may only show up for one of the public hearings. With separate public 
hearings, it is likely that some of the experts and lobbyists may attend the hearing for the first 
chamber committee and not the hearing for the second chamber committee, or vice versa, which 
means that the different committees could be working with different information when 
considering the same piece of legislation. Rhode Island addresses this problem by holding joint 
public hearings for important bills (Fairlie 1932, 32). 
 
Work Sessions 
 After holding public hearings, committees will meet for work sessions to thoroughly 
discuss the content of a bill and to resolve any disputes that may exist (Maine State Legislature 
2013b). This is the point where amendments are proposed and compromises are reached. These 
meetings are open to the public, but most of the major compromises and decisions are made 
behind the scenes by committee chairs, legislative leaders, and during party caucus meetings, 
which are not open to the public. The end result of these deliberations for each bill is a 
committee report, which is essentially a recommendation on how the full legislature should act 
(Satter 2009, 92). In Connecticut, the final decision on a bill typically has to be made by a preset 
deadline, which varies by committee (Satter 2009, 92). In Massachusetts, any bills referred to a 
committee before April 15 must be reported out of committee no later than the fourth 
Wednesday in June and any bills referred after that date must be reported on within 10 days 
(Massachusetts Bar Association 2014). In New Hampshire, this decision has to be made before a 
predetermined crossover date on which all bills originating in the first chamber must be sent over 
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to the second chamber (Grappone 2010). It is unclear if or when any of the other legislatures 
have such deadlines. 
 
Committee Report 
 The most important role of legislative committees is the power to recommend a bill to the 
entire legislature for passage in the form of a committee report. At this point in the process, 
committees must choose between several options. The most common committee actions are to 
table a bill (hold it in committee) or to issue a favorable report, an unfavorable report, or a 
change of reference to another committee (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 176; Satter 2009, 92). 
Committees can also recommend that a bill be amended and given a favorable report (Squire and 
Moncrief 2009, 176).  
In Massachusetts, committees can issue a study order, which technically means that a bill 
will be studied during the recess, but is often used as a quiet way to kill a bill (Massachusetts Bar 
Association 2014). New Hampshire has a similar action called "refer to interim study" (Northeast 
Information Services 2009, 2). In the first year of each General Court, New Hampshire 
committees can also re-refer a bill back to the committee to be revisited during the next year's 
session (Northeast Information Services 2009, 2). In Rhode Island, a bill can be reported to the 
floor with no recommendation (State of Rhode Island General Assembly 2014).  
Committees are most likely to give a bill a favorable report or table it. Committees tend 
to let bills die quietly by tabling them rather than issue an unfavorable report because it takes less 
time and effort, which can be better spent on bills that are likely to pass (Satter 2009, 92). At this 
point, a bill that is given a favorable report is sent to the first chamber for further action. Some 
bills will be referred to additional committees for further action before they are sent to their 
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originating chamber. In some cases referrals are mandatory. For example, bills that require the 
expenditure of money must be referred to the Appropriations or Ways and Means Committee. 
These subsequent committees have the same powers as the first committee, such as the ability to 
give the bill a committee report (Satter 2009, 94). In most states, a committee report is made 
when a bill is on the calendar for the second reading. A few days after the second reading and 
issuance of the committee report, a bill moves to the third reading calendar (Squire and Moncrief 
2009, 177). 
 
First Chamber 
 Next, a bill is sent to the first chamber for further action by the full legislature. In 
Connecticut, a bill is first sent to the Legislative Commissioners’ Office for a final review of its 
form, consistency with existing statutes, and constitutionality. If there are any problems, a bill is 
returned to committee. If everything is in order, the bill is then sent to the Office of Fiscal 
Analysis for a note on its fiscal impact, and finally to the Office of Legislative Research for a 
plain language summary of its provisions (Satter 2009, 95). The bill is then placed on the 
calendar of the first chamber. In Maine, a bill is first looked over by the committee’s legislative 
analysts, prepared by the Revisor's Office, and sent to the Office of Fiscal and Program Review 
to determine whether it will have a fiscal impact, which is amended to the bill (Maine State 
Legislature 2013b). The bill is then placed on the calendar of the first chamber. In 
Massachusetts, bills go through the amendment process in the full chamber and then are sent to 
the first chamber's Committee on Bills in the Third Reading where either the Senate or House 
Counsel reviews them for their proper legal form and approves them (Massachusetts Bar 
Association 2014). In Rhode Island, a bill is added to the calendar and reproduced with a short 
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explanation attached for distribution to the members of the legislature (State of Rhode Island 
General Assembly 2014). In New Hampshire and Vermont, bills are sent directly to the first 
chamber to be placed on the calendar for further action (Northeast Information Services 2009; 
Vermont General Assembly 2014). 
 Once a bill is on the calendar of the first chamber, it should eventually be selected by the 
presiding officer to be acted upon by the full chamber. This is yet another opportunity for a bill 
to die because the legislative leadership can decide not to act on a bill or the chamber can simply 
run out of time to act. When a bill is to be acted upon, its title and other identifying information 
is read by the clerk for the third time and the committee chairperson, or his designee, makes a 
motion for the chamber to accept the committee's favorable report and pass the bill. The same 
speaker will then explain the provisions of the bill, give reasons for approving it, and answer any 
questions pertaining to its substance (Satter 2009, 99). 
 A general debate of the bill's merits will typically take place among the rest of the 
chamber’s members, which is controlled by the presiding officer. The floor debate is typically 
just for show because all of the major decisions on the legislation in question have already been 
made behind the scenes (Satter 2009, 98). Although floor debate occasionally seems dramatic, 
the reality is that by this point, leadership, most legislators, and many lobbyists and other 
legislative observers know the outcome before a vote is even taken (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 
177) Legislative leaders, typically with the help of a screening committee, select the bills to be 
acted upon and the leaders of the majority and minority parties hold party caucus meetings to 
discuss upcoming legislation (Satter 2009, 98). During these meetings, leaders poll members of 
their party to find out how individual lawmakers intend to vote (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 177). 
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It is during these party caucuses that members are expected to disclose how they plan to vote on 
upcoming legislation, especially if they plan to vote against the other members of their party. 
 During floor debate, members often propose amendments, which are typically planned in 
advance. It is typically up to the presiding officer to decide whether or not to put proposed 
amendments to a vote (Satter 2009, 102). During party caucus meetings, members often discuss 
anticipated amendments and come up with a strategy for dealing with these amendments, 
especially those proposed by the other party (Satter 2009, 104). Legislative leaders typically 
want to make sure that amendments from the other party are defeated and that only approved 
amendments, which are consistent with their goals for a particular bill, pass. Failed amendment 
votes on controversial bills can sometimes be useful as political cover for members of both 
parties. 
 After the floor debate and amendment process, final action is taken by the whole 
membership of the chamber. The final vote on a bill is typically recorded on a roll-call machine 
or through the rise-and-be-counted procedure in order to publicly document the vote of each 
member (Satter 2009, 103). If the bill passes, it is sent to the second chamber for further action. 
If the chamber votes against passage, the bill is dead (Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2014). It 
is very rare for a bill to be defeated on a floor vote. The majority party leadership only brings 
bills to the floor for a vote if they are confident that the measures will pass (Squire and Moncrief 
2009, 178). 
 
Second Chamber 
 Next, the bill is transmitted to the second chamber for further action. In Connecticut, a 
bill must be held for one day before being transmitted to the second chamber, except during the 
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last five days of the session when it can be transmitted immediately upon passage (Satter 2009, 
103). At this point in the process, there are significant differences between state legislatures with 
joint committees and state legislatures with traditional bicameral committees. In the state 
legislatures with joint committees, bills are over halfway along the journey to become law and 
are sent directly to the second chamber for a third reading, the debate and amendment process, 
and further action on the floor. In Connecticut, if a bill has amendments from the first chamber, 
the second chamber will first act on the amendments and then on passage (Satter 2009, 103). In 
the state legislatures with traditional bicameral committees, bills are barely to the halfway point 
of the process and are sent to the second chamber for a first reading and a second round of 
committee referral (or referrals) (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 182). Bills then go through the 
committee process for a second time and are eventually sent to the second chamber for a third 
reading and final floor action (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 182). 
 If the first chamber added any amendments, the second chamber can then either adopt the 
amendment and pass the bill in concurrence with the first chamber or reject the amendment and 
pass the bill. If the second chamber adopts the amendment and passes the bill in concurrence, it 
goes on to the next step in the process. If the second chamber rejects the amendment, the bill is 
returned to the first chamber to resolve the differences. The first chamber can either pass the bill 
(without the amendment) in concurrence with the Senate or adopt a more friendly amendment 
and pass the bill on to the second chamber again. In order for a bill to move on to the next step in 
the process, both chambers need to pass the same bill with the same exact wording. If both 
chambers fail to resolve the differences on their own, they can convene an ad hoc conference 
committee to formally work out the differences (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 183). More 
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information on conference committees can be found in Chapter 4. If the differences are still not 
resolved, then the bill is dead. 
 
Final Enactment 
 In most states, a bill is then transmitted to the governor for further action. However, in 
Maine and Massachusetts further action is required before a bill can be transmitted to the 
governor. In these states, when a bill is passed following the debate and amendment process, it is 
passed to be engrossed. In Maine, this means printing the bill and all adopted amendments 
together in an integrated document for enactment (Maine State Legislature 2013b). In 
Massachusetts, this means the bill is printed on special parchment for enactment (Massachusetts 
Bar Association 2014). After a bill is passed to be engrossed, it is sent to the House of 
Representatives for enactment. After the House enacts a bill, it is sent to the Senate for 
enactment (Maine State Legislature 2013b; Massachusetts Bar Association 2014). In 
Massachusetts, the enactment process is typically just a formality, but sometimes a controversial 
bill will be debated and even rejected at this point (Massachusetts Bar Association 2014). 
Following enactment in the Senate a bill is then finally delivered to the governor for further 
action (Maine State Legislature 2013b; Massachusetts Bar Association 2014). 
 Once a bill reaches the governor, he or she may sign the measure into law, veto it, or do 
nothing and allow it to become law within a specified period of time, usually five to ten days 
(Squire and Moncrief 2009, 183; Council of State Governments 2013, 97-8). If the session ends 
during this specified period of time, the bill is effectively vetoed, in what is known as a pocket 
veto (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 183). If a bill is vetoed, it can be returned to the first chamber 
and overridden by a supermajority vote in both chambers (Squire and Moncrief 2009, 183-4). In 
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Connecticut and Maine, a supermajority is considered to be two thirds of the elected members in 
each chamber. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont, a supermajority is considered to 
be two thirds of the members present in each chamber. In Rhode Island, a supermajority is 
considered to be three fifths of the members present in each chamber (Council of State 
Governments 2013, 97-8). 
 
Conclusion 
 From this analysis, it is obvious that the legislative process in state legislatures with joint 
committees is shorter and maximizes all of the available legislative time. In state legislatures 
with traditional bicameral committees, the process involves more steps, some of which are 
repetitive, which simply wastes precious legislative time. Joint committees present an 
institutional arrangement that is more conducive to consensus building and compromise between 
chambers and allows members from both chambers to interact with one another in a formal and 
official setting. As an added bonus, the simpler legislative process in state legislatures with joint 
committees is easier for average citizens to follow and gives them a better chance to get involved 
in the process in a meaningful way. Most importantly, this breakdown of the legislative process 
shows how most tangible legislative work is accomplished during the committee process, which 
is why committees are often referred to as the workhorses of state legislatures. Therefore, if 
committees operate more effectively then the whole legislature operates more effectively.
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Chapter 4: Conference Committees and Conflicts Between the 
Houses 
 In bicameral legislatures, the separate chambers will often pass slightly different versions 
of the same legislation. In order for such legislation to make it to the governor's desk for 
consideration, the conflicts between these two versions need to be sorted out. During a legislative 
session, time is a valuable commodity and waiting to find a consensus between the chambers late 
in the process is a waste of this valuable time. In most bicameral legislatures, there are no official 
steps in the regular legislative process for the two chambers to work together to find a consensus. 
Most of this work occurs in unofficial meetings between the legislative leaders of each chamber, 
committee chairs of each chamber, and individual legislators. The two main ways that American 
legislative chambers officially interact with each other are through joint committees and 
conference committees. Since a consensus between the two chambers needs to be reached at 
some point, it makes sense to use joint committees from the start to reach a well thought out 
consensus before legislation even reaches the floor, rather than to use conference committees to 
reach a quick consensus when time is running out (Connecticut General Assembly 1994, 2). The 
use of joint committees helps legislatures focus their time more effectively and promotes more 
conciliatory governing practices. 
 Joint standing committees are committees that meet on a regular basis, while conference 
committees are ad hoc joint committees that only meet when they are needed. Although both 
committees are a type of joint committee, for the sake of simplicity, I will continue to refer to 
joint standing committees simply as joint committees. The key difference between these two 
types of committees is joint committees consider the legislation that will be considered by both 
chambers before it ever reaches the floor, while conference committees are assembled after 
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legislation reaches the floor in order to “iron out differences between house and senate passed 
versions of a bill" (Bowman and Kearney 2012, 127).  The main consequence of these 
differences is joint committees meet to consider legislation early on in a legislative session, 
while conference committees meet late in a legislative session when there are much greater time 
constraints. Conference committees are especially important because "they often deal with the 
most significant and controversial bills considered by the legislature each session" (American 
Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries and National Conference of State Legislatures, 
listed hereafter as ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-39). Although conference committees can be an 
important part of the process, the specific organization and procedures of conference committees 
differ greatly among the various state legislatures. 
 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the typical conference 
committee is made up of three to five members from each chamber, for a total of six to ten 
members, but the number can vary depending upon the particular legislature in question (1998, 
4-39). Conference committees that deal with fiscal bills are often larger than those that work on 
regular bills. Most of the New England legislative chambers analyzed in this study appoint three 
members, with the exception of the New Hampshire House, which appoints four or five members 
to fiscal conference committees (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-43–4-44). In Congress, there are no 
requirements governing the number of members appointed to conference committees and the 
delegation from each chamber does not even have to be equal (Squire and Hamm 2005, 114). 
The specific legislators who are appointed to serve on these committees usually depend upon the 
content of the bill and the type of bill in question. These legislators frequently include "the 
authors of bills, the chairs of standing committees, those with expertise or interest in the issue 
and those people to represent the body or caucus most capably" (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-
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39). In Congress, each chamber’s delegation is "traditionally drawn almost entirely from a single 
substantive committee of that house," (Squire and Hamm 2005, 114) except for cases in which 
more than one committee was involved with crafting a piece of legislation. 
The method of appointing these legislators differs slightly among the various state 
legislative chambers. In the Maine Senate and House, the New Hampshire Senate and House, 
and the Vermont House, the president of the Senate or the speaker of the House appoints 
legislators. In the Connecticut House the speaker pro tem appoints legislators, in the Connecticut 
Senate the majority leader appoints legislators, and in the Vermont Senate a committee on 
committees appoints legislators (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-46–4-47).1 The method of 
appointing a committee chair also differs among the various state legislative chambers. In some 
chambers, the presiding officer will select the chair and in others, the first member appointed to 
the committee acts as the chair (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-51–4-52). 
The main criterion that sets the conference committee procedures of the various states 
apart is the scope of the committee. Conference committees are charged with preparing a 
compromise version of a bill that is acceptable to both houses, but many committees are only 
able to review certain portions of a bill (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-40). Some legislatures, like 
the U.S. Congress, New Hampshire, and Vermont, use a limited scope, under which a conference 
committee may only consider those sections of a bill where differences between the two houses 
occur (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-40, 4-53). Other legislatures, such as Connecticut and Maine, 
use a free or open scope, under which the entire bill is subject to change (ASLCS and NCSL, 
1996, 4-40, 4-53). The rest of the state legislatures use either a combination of the two methods 
or a completely different scope depending upon the subject matter of the bill in question (ASLCS 
and NCSL, 1996, 4-40).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The MA and RI legislatures did not respond to the study. 
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When conference committees are in session, their procedures are typically governed by 
joint rules because it is easier for both chambers to use the same procedure when they work 
together (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-41). In congressional conference committees, there are 
virtually no rules governing deliberations and the only thing that matters is whether the 
committee report can pass both the House and the Senate (Squire and Hamm 2005, 115). The 
main aspects of the state legislature conference committee process that these procedures dictate 
are the vote required to reach an agreement and the signatures that are required on the committee 
report. A majority of American legislatures require a majority vote of the conferees from each 
chamber (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-41). Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, and Congress fall into 
this category (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-55; Squire and Hamm 2005, 115). Other states only 
require a majority vote of all conference committee members. However, in Iowa and New 
Hampshire, "adoption of the conference committee report requires a unanimous vote by both the 
Senate and House conferees" (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-41). The procedure for signing the 
conference committee report also differs among the various state legislatures. Some legislatures 
require that a majority of the conferees from each body sign the report, others require all 
conferees to sign the report, and others only require the committee chairs to sign the report 
(ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-41). 
These different voting and signature procedures can have major implications on the 
strategies used by the members of these conference committees to reach the necessary consensus. 
In the states that require a majority vote of all conference committee members, the members of 
each chamber's delegation only need to convince one member from the other chamber’s 
delegation to vote in favor of their proposal. This type of compromise can be reached more 
easily by offering the single member from the other chamber something to help in the next 
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election cycle, such as something new in his or her district like a train station on a new rail line. 
This type of strategy is typically most effective when the bill in question deals with 
appropriations. In the states that require a majority vote of the conferees from each chamber, a 
more substantial compromise must be reached on the legislation in question that can be accepted 
by the members of the delegations for both chambers. It seems more likely that conferees in this 
situation will focus on finding a compromise that applies to the proposal in question. In the states 
that require a unanimous vote by all conferees, a single conferee can hold up the entire process 
unless certain terms are agreed to, sort of like a filibuster in the U.S. Senate. The states that 
require a majority vote of the conferees from each chamber seem to have the most effective 
procedure because it will likely force the conferees to focus on a compromise on the proposal in 
question, rather than find a way to appeal to a single member to vote a certain way. This 
procedure also seems to increase the probability of gaining final passage by a majority of the full 
membership in each chamber, which after all is the goal of the conference committee. 
The last step in the conference committee process is the approval of the report and final 
bill by the full membership of both chambers. For this step, the main difference between the 
various states is the chamber that considers the report first. Some state legislatures send the 
report first to the originating chamber, which introduced the original bill (ASLCS and NCSL, 
1996, 4-41). In other legislatures, such as New Hampshire and Vermont, the non-originating 
chamber is the first to consider the report (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-41, 4-57). In some 
legislatures, like Maine, it depends upon the circumstances under which the conference 
committee was requested (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-41, 4-57). In Connecticut and Hawaii, the 
conference reports are taken up by both chambers simultaneously. When voting on the report, 
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some legislative chambers will use their normal voting rules, while others require the report be 
adopted by whatever vote was required to pass the original bill (ASLCS and NCSL, 1996, 4-42). 
Despite the similarities between joint committees and conference committees in their role 
of facilitating official communication between the two chambers, each type of committee 
exhibits a different balance of power between the two chambers. Studies of conference 
committees at the congressional level have concluded that the Senate is more likely to get its 
way. It has been suggested that this imbalance occurs because the Senate usually acts second, 
which forces the House to compromise further in order to get the bill out (Squire and Hamm 
2005, 115). Donald A. Gross conducted a similar study of conference committees in state 
legislatures, with a focus on appropriations bills, and found that the upper chamber does typically 
have an advantage in conference committee negotiations on budgetary matters (1980, 777). He 
also found that the partisan environment of the legislature in question has an effect on which 
chamber "wins" the conference committee negotiations (Gross 1980, 777). It makes sense that if 
a different party controls each chamber, one party may be more likely to hold its ground, 
especially if it believes the electorate is on their side. 
In the case of joint committees, the balance of power is the opposite, with the lower 
chamber holding the advantage. The main advantage that the lower chamber has is a greater 
number of voting members on each committee. The reason for this imbalance is the fact that the 
lower chamber always has more members than the upper chamber. For example, "[i]n 
Connecticut there [are] 151 House members to 35 Senate members, in Maine 151 to 33, and in 
Massachusetts 160 to 40. Each has a 4-to-1 to 5-to-1 ratio of house to senate members" (Francis 
1989, 120). In these three states with complete joint committee systems, a higher percentage of 
senators had complaints about the size of the committees, the number of committee assignments, 
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and the scheduling of committee meetings (Francis 1989, 120). Unfortunately, the only way for 
the upper chamber to change this membership disadvantage would be for senators to serve on 
even more committees. It is important to remember that if the senators believe they are at too 
much of a disadvantage on a certain issue, they can vote to split the committee into separate 
Senate and House committees, at least in Connecticut (Ogle 1974, 170). 
Although both joint committees and conference committees are biased towards one of the 
chambers, research has found that one type of committee is actually more effective than the 
other. According to an analysis of state legislatures by the American Political Science 
Association, "[i]n practice, joint committees greatly reduce the need for conference committees 
to reconcile legislative differences between the two chambers" (Squire and Hamm 2005, 44). 
Even with divided party rule, joint committees can be more effective. For example, up until 1993 
the Oregon state legislature operated for many years with a joint Ways and Means Committee to 
develop the budget. In 1993, the legislature had a Republican controlled House and a Democratic 
controlled Senate, which prompted the leadership to dissolve the joint committee and create a 
House Appropriations Committee and a Senate Ways and Means Committee. With two 
committees instead of one, the budget process took much longer because compromises that used 
to be made at the joint committee level were now being made in conference committees. As a 
result, the leadership committee studied the issue and recommended that the joint committee be 
reconstituted with expanded membership in the next session (Connecticut General Assembly 
1994, 2).  
It is important to keep in mind that legislative issues between the two chambers have to 
be resolved at some point, and with joint committees these issues are worked out before 
legislation reaches the floor (Connecticut General Assembly 1994, 2). The joint committee 
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system opens up an official dialogue between both chambers, which makes it easier to figure out 
which pieces of legislation have a bicameral consensus and are worth spending time on, and 
which pieces of legislation are contentious and are not worth the valuable time that remains in 
the legislative session. Joint committees promote more conciliatory governing practices and can 
help state legislatures focus their time more effectively.
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis 
 The purpose of this chapter is to quantitatively analyze the question of whether state 
legislatures that primarily use joint standing committees have a more effective legislative process 
than state legislatures that primarily use traditional bicameral standing committees. For the 
purpose of this analysis, effectiveness is defined as the ability of committees to report out bills 
that are passed by both legislative chambers. State legislatures need to maximize their 
effectiveness in order to take full advantage of legislative time, which is always in short supply, 
by focusing on bills that are likely to make it through the entire process. The analysis will focus 
on the New England states because three of them have the only state legislatures in the United 
States that primarily use joint committees for considering legislation. I decided to include the 
other three New England states because all six of these states share a common history, 
geographic similarities, similar institutional characteristics, and a unique political culture. More 
information about these shared characteristics can be found in Chapter 2. The state legislatures 
that primarily use joint committees are Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts and the state 
legislatures that primarily use traditional bicameral committees are New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont. 
 
Methods 
 I examine the link between joint committees and legislative effectiveness through an 
analysis of legislative data gathered from state legislative websites, the legislative tracking 
website LegiScan, and the Massachusetts legislative tracking service MassTrac. Some state 
legislative websites had more complete information than others, which forced me to turn to 
outside sources to make up for the lack of direct information reported by certain states. I was 
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able to find complete tables with the necessary information for most of the state legislatures for 
most of the session years in question. However, for some session years for some of the 
legislatures, I was forced to input data by hand after locating the necessary data through the 
search function on certain state legislative websites. For this analysis, I was only able to study 
the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 legislative terms because they were the only years that had readily 
available data on the Internet. A more in-depth study of more legislative terms would require 
entering data from each state's official legislative records by hand, which would be a time and 
labor intensive project, which was not possible for the time constraints I faced. 
 The two main dependent variables used in this analysis are the number of bills that pass 
only one chamber and the number of bills that pass both chambers during each legislative term. 
The independent variable is the type of committees that are primarily used by the state legislature 
in question, either joint committees or traditional bicameral committees. The number of bills that 
pass only one chamber includes bills that only received an affirmative vote in the first chamber. 
This number can include bills that received an affirmative vote in the first chamber followed by a 
negative vote in the second chamber and bills that received an affirmative vote in the first 
chamber and later died in the second chamber. The number of bills that passed both chambers 
includes any bills that received affirmative votes in both the first and second chambers. This 
number includes both bills that later became law and those vetoed by the governor. Bills with 
amendments that were not approved by a second chamber and bills that had conflicting versions 
under consideration in both chambers were counted as bills that only passed one chamber. More 
information on the other variables used in this study can be found below in the Hypothesis and 
Research Design section. 
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I plan to use this data to calculate the ratio between the number of bills that pass both 
chambers to the number of bills that pass only one chamber during the 2009-2010 and 2011-
2012 legislative terms in each of the New England state legislatures, which will be referred to as 
the effectiveness ratio. I also plan to calculate the effectiveness ratio for each state for an average 
legislative term. I will then compare the results between the states that have legislatures that 
primarily use joint committees with the states that have legislatures that primarily use traditional 
bicameral committees. My methods are similar to those used by Alan Clem in his 1978 study of 
bicameralism in the South Dakota state legislature. Part of his study involved identifying and 
counting the number of House and Senate bills passing both chambers and the number passing 
one chamber only (Clem 1978, 1). A more in-depth discussion of that study can be found in the 
Literature Review section of Chapter 1. 
 
Hypothesis and Research Design 
 The hypothesis here is that state legislatures that primarily use joint committees have a 
more effective legislative process than state legislatures that primarily use traditional bicameral 
committees. Therefore, I expect to find that state legislatures that primarily use joint committees 
have a higher effectiveness ratio than state legislatures that primarily use traditional bicameral 
committees. The hypothesis can be stated as such: 
H: The use of joint committees to consider legislation leads to a more effective 
legislative process. 
 The independent variable is whether or not the state legislature in question primarily uses 
joint committees to consider legislation. Dependent variables include the number of bills that 
pass only one chamber, the number of bills that pass both chambers, and the effectiveness ratio. 
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The effectiveness ratio, expressed as a percentage, is calculated by dividing the number of bills 
that pass both chambers by the number of bills that pass only one chamber. A possible 
confounding variable is the partisan balance between the legislative branch and executive branch 
of the states in question. 
The range of the effectiveness ratio variable is either less than, equal to, or greater than 
100%. A state legislature with an effectiveness ratio less than 100% would be considered 
inefficient because it shows the separate chambers of the legislature in question disagree on 
legislation more than they agree. A state legislature with an effectiveness ratio equal to 100% 
would be considered neutral because it shows the separate chambers of the legislature in question 
agree on legislation as much as they disagree on legislation. A state legislature with an 
effectiveness ratio greater than 100% would be considered efficient because it shows the separate 
chambers of the legislature in question agree on legislation more than they disagree.  
 
Table 5A: Effectiveness Ratio for the Average Legislative Term 
	   	  
Average	  Legislative	  Term	  
State	   Joint	  committees	  
Bills	  That	  Passed	  
Both	  Chambers	  
Bills	  That	  Passed	  
One	  Chamber	  
Effectiveness	  
Ratio	  
Connecticut1	   Yes	   543.5	   288.5	   188%	  
Maine2	   Yes	   959	   32	   2997%	  
Massachusetts3	   Yes	   724	   208	   348%	  
New	  Hampshire4	   No	   539.5	   208.5	   259%	  
Rhode	  Island5	   No	   968.5	   714	   136%	  
Vermont6	   No	   175	   59.5	   294%	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (Connecticut General Assembly 2013b) 
2 (Maine State Legislature 2013a; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
3 (InstaTrac, Inc. 2013) 
4 (New Hampshire General Court 2013; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
5 (State of Rhode Island General Assembly 2013; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
6 (Vermont General Assembly 2013; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
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Table 5B: Effectiveness Ratios By Legislative Term 
	  
2009-­‐2010	  Legislative	  Term	   2011-­‐2012	  Legislative	  Term	  
State	  
Joint	  
committees	  
Bills	  That	  
Passed	  Both	  
Chambers	  
Bills	  That	  
Passed	  
One	  
Chamber	  
Effectiveness	  
Ratio	  
Bills	  That	  
Passed	  Both	  
Chambers	  
Bills	  That	  
Passed	  
One	  
Chamber	  
Effectiveness	  
Ratio	  
Connecticut7	   Yes	   603	   341	   177%	   484	   236	   205%	  
Maine8	   Yes	   947	   21	   4510%	   971	   43	   2258%	  
Massachusetts9	   Yes	   728	   172	   423%	   720	   244	   295%	  
New	  Hampshire10	   No	   603	   147	   410%	   476	   270	   176%	  
Rhode	  Island11	   No	   941	   623	   151%	   996	   805	   124%	  
Vermont12	   No	   159	   53	   300%	   191	   66	   289%	  
 
Results and Analysis 
 The results of the data analysis can be found in Table 5A and Table 5B, which are located 
above. Table 5A shows the effectiveness ratio of each of the New England state legislatures over 
the course of an average legislative term. The values in Table 5A were calculated by adding 
together the values from the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 legislative terms and dividing them by 
two. Table 5B breaks down the results into individual legislative terms. In Table 5A, it is 
immediately clear that Maine, a state that primarily uses joint committees, has the highest 
average effectiveness ratio at 2,997%, which is more than 2,000% higher than all of the other 
New England state legislatures. In fact, it has a higher average effectiveness ratio than all of the 
other New England states combined. In contrast, it is clear that Rhode Island, a state that 
primarily uses traditional bicameral committees, has the lowest average effectiveness ratio at 
136%. It is also worth noting that none of the New England legislatures had an effectiveness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 (Connecticut General Assembly 2013b) 
8 (Maine State Legislature 2013a; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
9 (InstaTrac, Inc. 2013) 
10 (New Hampshire General Court 2013; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
11 (State of Rhode Island General Assembly 2013; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
12 (Vermont General Assembly 2013; eLobbyist LLC 2014) 
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ratio of less than 100%, which means the separate legislative chambers in these states seem to 
agree on legislation more often than they disagree. 
 The ranking of states by average effectiveness ratio (in Table 5A) in order, from largest 
to smallest, is as follows: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island. The ranking of Maine and Massachusetts as numbers one and two with 
effectiveness ratios of 2,997% and 348%, respectively, helps support the hypothesis that state 
legislatures that primarily use joint committees have a higher effectiveness ratio. However, 
Connecticut is a major outlier with an effectiveness ratio of just 188%, which is only higher than 
Rhode Island. The fact that Connecticut was outranked by both New Hampshire and Vermont 
definitely seems to challenge the hypothesis. Some of the possible reasons for Connecticut's low 
effectiveness ratio will be explored later in this section, in the breakdown of individual 
legislative terms. 
 In Table 5B, which shows separate effectiveness ratios for the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 
legislative terms, there is a variation in effectiveness ratio rankings between the two legislative 
terms. For the 2009-2010 legislative term the effectiveness ratio rankings, from highest to 
lowest, are as follows: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island. For the 2011-2012 Legislative Term, the effectiveness ratio rankings, from highest 
to lowest, are as follows: Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and 
Rhode Island. Maine and Massachusetts consistently had the top two effectiveness ratios, which 
seems to somewhat support the hypothesis. The main changes between the two legislative terms 
include Connecticut's one position rise in the effectiveness ratio rankings and New Hampshire's 
two position fall in the effectiveness ratio rankings. 
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Table 5C: Partisan Balance 
	   	   2009-­‐2010	  Partisan	  Balance*	   2011-­‐2012	  Partisan	  Balance*	  
State	   Joint	  committees	   Senate	   House	   Governor	   Senate	   House	   Governor	  
Connecticut	   Yes	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Republican	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	  
Maine	   Yes	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Republican	   Republican	   Republican	  
Massachusetts	   Yes	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	  
New	  Hampshire	   No	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Republican	   Republican	   Democratic	  
Rhode	  Island	   No	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Republican	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Independent	  
Vermont	   No	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Republican	   Democratic	   Democratic	   Democratic	  
*(Lucy Burns Institute 2014) 
 A confounding variable that may account for the change in effectiveness ratios between 
the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 legislative terms is the partisan balance of the state legislatures in 
question, which can be found above in Table 5C. For the 2009-2010 legislative term Connecticut 
had an effectiveness ratio of 177%, which rose to a 205% effectiveness ratio for the 2011-2012 
legislative term. During Connecticut’s 2009-2010 legislative term the state had divided party 
government, with a Democratic Senate and House and a Republican governor. During 
Connecticut's 2011-2012 legislative term the state had a unified Democratic controlled 
government. New Hampshire faced a similar situation that might account for its effectiveness 
ratio decrease from 410% during the 2009-2010 legislative term to 176% during the 2011-2012 
legislative term. New Hampshire went from having a Democratic controlled legislature and a 
Republican governor to a Republican controlled legislature and a Democratic governor. 
 Looking at all of the states for both legislative terms, there appears to be a correlation 
between a state's effectiveness ratio and partisan balance. During the 2009-2010 legislative term 
the top three states of Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire had unified Democratic 
government, while the bottom three states of Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island had 
divided government. During the 2011-2012 legislative term, the top four states of Maine, 
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Massachusetts, Vermont, and Connecticut had unified party government, while the bottom two 
states of New Hampshire and Rhode Island had divided party government. 
Although the governor has no official role to affect whether or not only one house or both 
houses pass a bill, the fact that any legislation has to go through the governor in order to become 
law will affect the strategies used in the legislature. The leaders of the legislature may decide to 
pass as many things as possible in order to force the governor to make tough decisions on major 
state issues. Or the leaders could decide that maximizing legislative time is no longer a priority 
because there is so little that they may agree on with the governor and focus on policy incubation 
for legislation they hope to pass in the future when their party controls the executive branch. Or 
the leaders could decide to only focus on bills that are likely to receive supermajority support in 
an effort to overrule the governor completely. No matter what the situation, it is likely that 
legislatures are going to act differently with divided government then with a government unified 
under one party’s control. 
It may be no coincidence that the two states with the highest effectiveness ratios, Maine 
and Massachusetts, also happen to have have unified party government in addition to joint 
committees. During both of the legislative terms in this study, Massachusetts had both a 
Democratic legislature and a Democratic governor. In contrast, Maine had unified Democratic 
government during the 2009-2010 legislative term and unified Republican government during 
the 2011-2012 legislative term. During periods of unified party government, it is likely that 
legislatures may feel more pressure to maximize legislative effectiveness to enact as many of 
their policies as possible while their majority status lasts. 
It is also worth noting that Rhode Island, which had the lowest effectiveness ratio for 
both of the legislative terms in this study, had divided government during both legislative terms. 
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During the 2009-2010 legislative term, Rhode Island had a Democratic controlled legislature and 
a Republican governor. During the 2011-2012 legislative term, Rhode Island had a Democratic 
controlled legislature and an independent governor. The leaders of the legislature may have 
decided that there are few issues on which the separate parties can compromise, which means 
legislative effectiveness may simply not be a priority. The effect of a state's partisan balance on 
legislative effectiveness is difficult to quantify in this analysis, but the subject definitely warrants 
future investigation. 
There are a number of factors that could also impact the results of this study. These range 
from cultural differences to the content of the legislation considered during each legislative term 
to major unexpected events that dominate states politics. The unique institutional characteristics 
of each states legislature, such as the number of legislators and size of districts, could also have 
an impact. It is impossible to account for all of them. No two state legislatures in the United 
States are exactly the same, which makes it difficult to establish major causal links in a 
comparative analysis of state legislatures. 
 
Conclusion 
 This analysis of joint committees shows that there is likely a connection between the 
primary use of joint committees and legislative effectiveness, as defined in the study, especially 
in the case of Maine and Massachusetts. The results only confirmed the hypothesis in two out of 
three cases, which left Connecticut as a major outlier in terms of legislative effectiveness. There 
is a long way to go in establishing a significant link between the primary use of joint committees 
and legislative effectiveness. Hopefully this study will pave the way for future research into the 
effectiveness of joint committees on a more comprehensive scale. An obvious avenue for further 
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investigation would be to look at a greater number of legislative terms, which would definitely 
require a greater amount of time and resources because the oldest readily available electronic 
data is less than 15 years old. Putting together a larger data set would require manually going 
through official legislative records to count the final status of all bills that received a least an 
affirmative vote in the first chamber. 
 Future research on the subject of joint committees would also benefit from additional 
data points. Future research could include an analysis of committee voting records, the number 
of hours committees spend considering legislation, the number of people who testify at public 
hearings, and the number of times conference committees are convened to work out inter-
chamber compromises. It would be interesting to look into the amount of time spent on 
redundant activity in state legislatures that primarily use traditional bicameral committees in 
comparison to their counterparts that primarily use joint committees. One of the most fascinating 
aspects of joint committees that should be further studied is if they work as effectively when 
each chamber is controlled by a different party. The most recent time that this happened in the 
United States was in the 1995-1996 legislative term in both Connecticut and Maine (Lucy Burns 
Institute 2014). It would be interesting to see if legislators are more likely to work out interparty 
compromises in a joint committee setting. The quantitative study of joint committees is in its 
infancy and should definitely be investigated further. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 The purpose of this work is to answer the question of whether the joint committee system 
primarily used in the Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts state legislatures leads to a more 
effective legislative process than the traditional bicameral committee system primarily used in 
the New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island state legislatures. For the purpose of this study, 
I have defined effectiveness as the ability of committees to maximize legislative time through the 
early resolution of differences between senators and representatives in an effort to ensure both 
the Senate and House pass the bills they report out. Going into this study, I hypothesized that the 
use of joint committees does lead to a more effective legislative process. The preceding chapters 
have shown that this hypothesis is a valid one and there appears to be a link between the use of 
joint committees and a more effective legislative process that needs to be explored further. 
 My qualitative analysis has shown that state legislatures that primarily use traditional 
bicameral committees have unnecessary redundancies in both their institutional arrangement and 
legislative process. In these legislatures, bills have to go through the committee process twice, 
which means separate committees will hold separate public hearings and meetings on the same 
bills. These redundancies waste valuable time and resources and create unnecessary barriers 
between the two chambers that impede their ability to compromise. In contrast, the use of joint 
committees promotes the more effective use of fewer resources and creates an institutional 
arrangement that puts senators and representatives in the same room on a regular basis, which 
helps facilitate compromises between chambers. When senators and representatives come to a 
consensus early in the committee process, they are able to focus their time more effectively on 
legislation that is more likely to pass both chambers. As a result, legislatures that primarily use 
joint committees have a simpler legislative process with fewer steps, which presents fewer 
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opportunities for legislation to die a confusing death later in the process, making it easier for the 
average citizen to follow. The most important effect of joint committees is the fact that they 
prevent the waste of precious legislative time on issues that have no chance of becoming law. 
 My quantitative study analyzed the legislative effectiveness ratios of the New England 
states, a concept derived from dividing the number of bills passed by both chambers by the 
number of bills passed by only one chamber. The study found that there is likely a connection 
between the primary use of joint committees and legislative effectiveness, especially in Maine 
and Massachusetts. However, Connecticut was a major outlier, which led me to investigate the 
partisan balance of state legislatures as a possible confounding variable. Since Maine and 
Massachusetts were the only states to have unified one party government during the legislative 
terms in question and primarily use joint committees, it is clear that more quantitative research 
needs to be done to investigate the link between joint committees and legislative effectiveness. 
The impact of joint committees could prove to be affected by the partisan balance of the state in 
question. This is a hypothesis that could be tested using multivariate analysis. A more 
comprehensive study could be done by looking at significantly more legislative terms, which was 
impossible for me to accomplish because of limited time and resources. 
 Future research on the effectiveness of joint committees can be accomplished in many 
different forms. One of the most important sources of information are the New England state 
legislators themselves. Francis briefly investigated joint committees by surveying legislators on 
their main criticisms of the joint committee system (1989, 120). A more comprehensive version 
of this study could be done to evaluate the procedural effectiveness of joint committees by 
interviewing more legislators with a greater array of questions. This type of approach would be 
most effective for studying one of the most fascinating aspects of joint committees, which is their 
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effectiveness under divided party rule when the Senate and House are controlled by separate 
parties. The last time such a situation occurred was during the 1995-1996 legislative term in both 
Connecticut and Maine (Lucy Burns Institute 2014). It might also be helpful to look at additional 
quantitative variables, such as an analysis of committee voting records, the number of hours 
committees spend considering legislation, the number of people who testify at public hearings, 
and the number of times conference committees are convened to work out inter-chamber 
compromises. 
 In the current climate of fiscal uncertainty and a more prominent focus on state 
legislatures to address the important political issues of our time, the effectiveness of state 
legislatures is more important than ever. If more states adopted joint committees to primarily 
consider legislation, they could eliminate unnecessary redundancies in the process, which could 
save money by reducing the number of committee staffers needed to conduct business. Since the 
institutional arrangement of joint committees promotes compromise, they could help create a 
more conciliatory atmosphere that is desperately needed to combat the partisan gridlock that 
plagues politics today. 
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